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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study is to bring to light some of the most formative innovations in 
the Ottoman legal administration that unfolded by the 16th Century. It serves to 
macroscopically trace back some of the major developments that led to the crystallization 
of the Ottoman legal system and the state’s administration of justice. This study thus aims 
to demonstrate the process of the making of Ottoman law through the early attempts of 
codifying a comprehensive legal code together with the creation of a unique form of 
“Ottoman Hanafism.” Furthermore, it aims to examine the role of some of the state actors 
as well as the judiciary in giving rise to a bureaucratic system of administration in 
attempting to establish standardization and uniformity throughout the empire and in 
bringing in line all of the empire’s provinces.  
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INTRODUCTION 	
Various aspects of the bureaucratic structure of the Ottoman administration after the 
conquests of the 15th and 16th Centuries reveal a number of factors that are fundamental 
to the understanding of the broader developments of the Ottoman legal system, the 
introduction of a series of new policies, and the implications those developments had on 
the way society functioned. The incorporation of new territories and the extension of the 
empire to new frontiers meant that the empire now encompassed different forms of legal 
systems, different religious traditions, different cultural practices, as well as other forms 
of administering societies. With this complex legal and cultural landscape, the Ottoman 
authorities opted for bringing all its provinces in line with one another through a 
bureaucratic process of standardizing the system of administration throughout the empire. 
This also called for attempting to create a powerful central authority that would regulate 
the core-periphery relations and how the localities were administered. Furthermore, the 
Ottoman state intended to construct a judicial system that would serve as a tool of power 
assertion and would “Ottomanize” the way justice was administered. 
The Ottoman innovations took a number of forms that will be examined 
throughout the next few chapters and fitted within the overall framework. What will be 
briefly mentioned here in a non-chronological order to serve the introductory purposes of 
this study are the wider developments of the administrative legal structure that were 
aimed at creating a uniform system of authority and an Ottomanized form of 
administering justice. Haim Gerber, Guy Burak, and Nelly Hanna draw attention to some 
of the most fundamental and novel administrative policies that were implemented by the 
Ottoman authorities. The most foundational of those developments to the Ottoman legal 
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system was appointing the Hanafi School of Law as the official imperial madhhab of the 
empire.1 This meant that the legal opinions and rulings that were to be practiced were 
limited to what Rudolph Peters refers to as a distinctive form of “Ottoman Hanafism.”2 
Other important developments that are closely interconnected with the rise of an official 
madhhab is the evolution of the religious institution, which occasioned the appearance of 
an imperial learned hierarchy, the appointment of muftis by the imperial authorities, and 
the appearance of the position of the grand mufti (seyhulislam) whose role was to oversee 
the entire religious institution.3 This also meant that he became the institution’s “chief 
judicial and scholarly authority,”4 who was responsible for all its nominations.5 
The position of the Sultan by the 16th Century also represented an integral 
component of the legal structure of the Ottoman central administration. The definition of 
justice in the golden age of Suleyman al-Kanuni went hand in hand with the notion of the 
ideal ruler.6 The Sutlan came to be regarded as the embodiment of justice for several 
reasons: the power vested in him meant that he ensured the welfare of society by 
sustaining a stable powerful central authority;7 the collections of legal codes and firmans 
decreed by Sultan Suleyman further idealized him as the “Lawgiver;” and the wide 
discretion he exercised when it came to executing siyaset punishments was maintained as 
																																																								
1 Burak, Guy. The Second Formation of Islamic Law: The Hanafi School in the Early Modern Ottoman 
Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. 
2 Peters, Rudolph. “What Does it Mean to Be an Official Madhhab? Hanafism and the Ottoman Empire,” in 
The Islamic School of Law: Evolution, Devolution, and Progress. Eds. Peri Baerman, Rudolph Peters, and 
Frank E. Vogel. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2005, pp. 147-158. 
3 Burak, The Second Formation of Islamic Law, 11 
4 Ibid. 
5 Gerber, Haim, Islamic Law and Culture, 1600-1840. Leiden: Boston, 1999, p. 30.  
6 Yilmaz, Mehmet S. “Crime and Punishment in the Imperial Historiography of Suleyman the Magnificent: 
An Evaluation of Nişancı Celâlzâde’s View.” Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, Vol. 
60, No. 4 (2007): 427-445.   
7 Ibid., 430. 
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being in the interest of society, so long as his siyasa is ‘adila and not zalima,8 and 
representing “the fulfillment of divine justice.”9 Furthermore, the bureaucratic structure 
of the empire by the 16th Century meant that there was a system of administration that 
was based on a series of objectives and laws and not one that is based on arbitrariness and 
despotism.10 This in turn magnified the just character of Sultan Suleyman’s rule. Another 
significant development that went well into the 17th and 18th Centuries was the popular 
institution of petitioning the Sultan by the state’s subjects against wrong done by 
Ottoman officials,11 based on the encouragement of the sultan himself.12 However, as 
James Baldwin argues, those petitions were not only centered on disputes between 
subjects and state officials, but also on disputes between the subjects themselves.13 As 
such, the Sultan was, in theory, the “supreme judicial authority.”14 He was to preside over 
how justice was administered even if he was not the one administering it. 
The Imperial Council (divan-i Humayun) was another form of Ottoman 
development that was pivotal to the bureaucratic structure of the administration of justice. 
The divan functioned as the advisory panel of the sultan on matters regarding political 
and military issues.15 It was more concerned with administrative functions and other 
policies that did not warrant crucial decisions.16 Apart from those functions, it also served 																																																								
8 Heyd, Uriel. Studies in old Ottoman Criminal Law. Ed. V.L. Menage. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973, p. 
199-200. 
9 Yilmaz, “Crime and Punishment in the Historiography of Suleyman,” 430.  
10 Gerber, Haim. State, Society, and Law in Islam: Ottoman Law in Comparative Perspective. Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1994, p. 127.  
11 Ibid., 154. 
12 Inalcik, Halil. “State, Sovereignty and Law During the Reign of Suleyman,” in Suleyman the Second and 
His Time. Eds. Halil Inalcik and Cemal Kafadar. Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1993, pp. 59-92. 
13 Baldwin, James E. “Petitioning the Sultan in Ottoman Egypt.” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and 
African Studies 75, no. 3 (2012): 499–524. 
14 Heyd, Old Ottoman Criminal Law, p. 227. 
15 Imber, Colin. The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: The Structure of Power. New York & London: Palgrave 
Macmillan Press, 2002, p. 155. 
16 Heyd, Old Ottoman Criminal Law, p. 225. 
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as a supreme court of justice where the Grand Vizier adjudicated lawsuits and trials on the 
basis of shari’a and state laws or he would delegate the task to either the Kadi-‘asker of 
Rumeli or the Kadi-‘asker of Anadolu (both were also permanent members of the 
imperial council).17 The imperial council was intended to function as another amicable 
component of preventing injustices through keeping in check the powers of the state 
officials, carrying out siyaset punishments,18 and hearing out the subjects’ grievances.19 
Furthermore, what differentiated the Ottoman imperial council from other non-Ottoman 
divans such as that of the Mamluk’s dar al-‘adl is that no muftis, not even the 
seyhulislam himself, had a seat in the council.20 By the reign of Mehmet II, the imperial 
council took on a more formal structure where the sultan abandoned the tradition of 
presiding over the council himself and informally administering justice. He in turn 
assigned the presidency of the council to his Grand Vizier who took on the sultan’s duties 
in the council.21 
Another set of developments that was brought about by the Ottoman policies is 
the rise in prominence of the position of the qadi—who was an integral part of the 
judicial hierarchy—and the shari’a courts.22 The qadi was intended to pass rulings in 
accordance to the Hanafi doctrine and the administrative laws as part of the process of 
standardizing the judicial system.23 With the appearance of the courthouses in some areas 
																																																								
17 Heyd, Old Ottoman Criminal Law, p. 225. 
18 Inalcik, “State, Sovereignty and Law,” p. 60. 
19 Ibid., 89. 
20 Heyd, Old Ottoman Criminal Law, p. 225. 
21 Imber, The Ottoman Empire, p. 156.  
22 Gerber, Islamic Law and Culture, p. 31. 
23 Gerber, State, Society, and Law in Islam, p. 63. 
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for the first time such as Cairo,24 there was a lot of emphasis that was placed on the role 
the qadi played as a judge and as a mediator. However, the demand for the qadi went 
beyond just the confines of the courthouse. His role also necessitated keeping in check 
the power exercised by the executive authorities25 and overseeing the marketplace.26 
Moreover, in regards to the shari’a courts, the Ottoman development of restructuring the 
court system aimed at creating a uniform judicial establishment throughout the Ottoman 
provinces that would standardize the way justice was administered.27 There were a 
number of other innovative policies enacted by the Ottoman authorities within the court 
system itself that will be further discussed throughout this thesis. 
One of the initial realizations of the Ottoman objectives of creating a uniform 
working legal system for the empire and standardizing the way justice was administered 
were the early attempts of codifying the law. It must be noted here that any of the above 
mentioned developments could not be treated in their own respect without considering 
the evolution of state laws. Even though the kanunname is often attributed to Suleyman I, 
the earliest attempts of codification go back to the reign of Mehmet II (1451-81).28 
However, it was only under the reign of Sultan Suleyman the Magnificent or Suleyman 
al-kanuni (1520-1566) and the enormous territorial expansion that the Ottoman legal 
system witnessed its greatest achievements. A lot of the policies that were enacted by the 
16th Century helped set in motion the Ottoman legal developments that took place. 
																																																								
24 Hanna, Nelly. “The Administration of Courts in Ottoman Cairo,” in The State and its Servants: 
Administration in Egypt from Ottoman Times to the Present. Ed. Nelly Hanna. Cairo: The American 
University in Cairo Press, (1995): 45-59. 
25 Peters, Rudolph. Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law: Theory and Practice from the Sixteenth to the 
Twenty-first Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 75. 
26 Zilfi, Madeline C. “Sultan Suleyman and the Ottoman Religious Establishment,” in Suleyman the Second 
and His Time. Eds. Halil Inalcik and Cemal Kafadar. Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1993, pp. 109-120. 
27Hanna, “The Administration of Courts in Ottoman Cairo,” p. 46.  
28 Peters, Crime and Punishment, p. 73.  
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Furthermore, the promulgation of state laws and sultanic decrees by the Ottoman 
authorities played a great role in the regulation of the core institutional and doctrinal 
developments.29 That said, the emergence of a series of Ottoman innovations in the 
judicial and administrative systems were a product of the Ottoman kanun. Moreover, to 
fully understand the dynamic and complex nature of the kanun, one has to configure the 
kanun-shari’a legal discourse that will be highlighted in one way or another throughout 
this present study. 
By examining the series of the newly enacted Ottoman policies by the state 
authorities, one could further understand to what extent those novel developments 
contributed to the evolution and structure of the Ottoman legal system. Moreover, by 
analyzing how those policies were imposed from above, one could also understand how 
society came to be integrated into the legal system and how it interacted with it from 
below. With that said, the present study will explore the Ottoman innovative policies in 
light of the conquests of the 15th and 16th Centuries and will call into question the extent 
of the successes and failures of the Ottoman state’s objectives to standardize and 
bureaucratize the system of administration. It has to be further noted here that one must 
take into consideration that those broader developments that the Ottoman authorities 
intended to implement should be treated as complex and intricate forms of policies that, 
in reality, truly captured the dichotomy between law and application—between theory 
and practice. Thus, this study will also shed light on the implications the introduction of 
the Ottomanized features had on state and society and how, at times, the imposition of 
new laws by force were met with opposition. 																																																								
29 Burak, Guy. “The Second Formation of Islamic Law: The Post Mongol Context of the Ottoman Adoption 
of a School of Law.” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 55: 3 (2013): 579-602. 
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In light of the main theme of the present work—which is standardization and 
centralization of the Ottoman administration—, the first chapter will introduce some of 
the broader features that formed the main pillars of Ottoman law and that helped set in 
motion the rest of the Ottoman policies that will be examined in the chapters that follow. 
The focus here will be on the appointment of the Hanafi madhab as the official school of 
law and the codification of the kanun. The first section will attempt to identify the extent 
of the Ottoman state’s involvement in the specific branch of Hanafi law and the creation 
of a learned hierarchy. Moreover, it will aim to examine the implications of having an 
official school of law amidst the conquests of the non-Hanafi Arab lands in the 16th 
Century. The second section will work toward highlighting the evolution of the kanun 
from the 15th Century to its peak in the 16th Century and capture the change the kanun 
introduced to the system of administration. Furthermore, this section will also draw 
attention to the kanun-shari’a discourse that has been approached by a lot of scholarly 
work as well as highlight how the shari’a was brought within the Ottoman legal context. 
This point of contention cannot be addressed without underlining the different approaches 
that scholars have taken in attempting to answer the question of whether the shari’a and 
kanun were in symbiosis with one another or in conflict. 
The second chapter will deal with the Ottoman administration from the standpoint 
of the state and the different outlets that were employed to regulate the imperial central 
authority. The focus here will be on reviewing the role different agencies of the state 
played in administering justice and how they contributed to the evolution of the system of 
administration. This chapter will also shed light on the more intricate developments that 
took place within the system itself through those agents. The first section will attempt to 
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assess the role the sultan played as the embodiment of justice and how his position was 
closely interlocked with the promulgation of state laws. It will further try to elucidate 
how the doctrine of siyasa shari’ya was utilized as an extra-legal practice executed by the 
sultan and his state officials as a form of administering justice. The second section will 
examine the introduction of the Imperial Council (divan-i Humayun) as a novel form of 
administering justice and regulating administrative policies. It will attempt to study the 
function and structure of the divan and how it was intended to centralize the state’s 
authority. Furthermore, it will help to explain the place the institution of petitioning the 
sultan had in the system of administration.  
The third chapter is concerned with the judiciary. It will review the new features 
introduced in the judicial system through examining the roles the seyhulislam and qadi 
played in the administration of justice. It will portray the different functions they 
occupied in the setup of the administrative system and how they were more or less 
integrated in the social scene. Section one will be centered on Ebu’s-Su’ud and his efforts 
in particular as an important contender in the process of standardizing the administrative 
system and legitimizing the state’s authority. The second section will trace back the rise 
in prominence of the position of the qadi and the changes this institution has witnessed 
over the pre-modern and early modern periods as well as the question of judicial 
corruption. 
The previous chapter will help explicate how the law and system of 
administration were imposed from above, while the last chapter of this study will aim to 
portray how society functioned within that system from below. Thus, this chapter aims to 
examine the law in practice and how society came to interact with the innovations of the 
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Ottoman policies. It will further aspire to depict how at times the restructuring of the 
system of administration was met with resistance, and how at other instances people were 
starting to integrate those newly introduced features into their daily lives. It will also 
examine the process of the Ottomanization of the courthouses and how they served as the 
platform for regulating public morality. It will study three Ottoman innovations in the 
fields of marriage fees, zina (fornication), and prostitution. The first section will deal with 
the reaction of the indigenous class of ulama in face of the Ottoman authorities 
implementing novel fees on marriage and the obligation that marriage had to be drawn by 
a qadi in court. The second and third sections will attempt to investigate crimes of sexual 
transgressions and how the state came to be an integral player in regulating public 
morality and revolutionizing how criminal law was dealt with. They will aim to study 
how those policies affected the way justice was administered and how they altered the 
Ottoman legal landscape. Furthermore, the two sections will primarily shed light on how 
the state brought the private affairs into the public sphere. 
The focus here is not to create a comprehensive historiography that fulfills all 
aspects of the Ottoman law, state, and society in the 16th Century, but rather to capture 
snapshots in the history of the administrative developments that occurred over the pre-
modern period in order to have a better understanding of how the series of those new 
policies fit together within the framework of standardizing and centralizing the Ottoman 
administration. While the main thematic fabric of this study is standardization and 
centralization, there are other important themes that are closely interlocked with the 
broader theme. One of those that will be highlighted here is the administration of justice. 
Through underlining the main functions and patterns of administration of the state’s 
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enforcement agencies, this will help reveal a number of things regarding how justice was 
administered on the grassroot level of society. Other thematic elements that will be 
examined here are the changes and ramifications brought about by the introduction of 
new policies. Finally, a portion of this study is grounded on the concept of legitimacy. In 
understanding the reality of the administrator and how he based the legitimation of his 
rulership on the façade of justice, one could begin to formulate a clearer image of how 
law was imposed from above versus how it was dealt with on the ground level of society. 
It would further aid in explicating the reality of the core-periphery relations. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE OTTOMAN LAW-MAKING 	
This chapter will attempt to analyze the process of the making of Ottoman law and 
highlight the changes that were introduced to the administrative system that altered the 
legal landscape of the empire. It will showcase how, with the newly appropriated lands, 
the Ottoman legal system functioned in relation to other pre-existing systems of law and 
how also at other times, it had introduced new forms of state laws that were meant to 
ensure their dominance and centralization.30 This chapter is meant to further draw 
attention to the restructuring of the legal system in light of the new features and 
innovations introduced by the Ottoman authorities. Furthermore, it will aim to examine 
how the changes that were initiated in the Ottoman administration of justice were meant 
to bring about a legal process of standardization and uniformity throughout the empire. 
I. The Official Madhhab: The Hanafi School of Law  
When Sultan Suleyman al-Kanuni visited and ordered the reconstruction of the tomb of 
Abu Hanifa—the founding father of the Hanafi School of Law—shortly after the 
conquest of Baghdad in 1535, this event had marked a significant type of endorsement of 
the Hanafi madhhab by the Ottoman dynasty.31 The development of a distinctive form of 
Hanafism by the Ottoman Empire had begun earlier in the 15th Century.32 However, in 
order to understand the full scope of how the Ottoman administration developed a 
particular branch in the Hanafi School of law and how it regulated a specific type of 
shari’a that was well-suited to their own discourse of law as well as understanding the 
implications those new features had on the law-making process, it is essential to first 																																																								
30 Burak, The Second Formation of Islamic Law, p. 14.  
31 Burak, “The Second Formation of Islamic Law,” p. 581. 
32 Ibid., 582. 
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examine the nature of the structure and doctrine of the Hanafi school in the period of the 
pre-Ottoman conquest.33 
As early as the 8th Century, the Sunni schools of law were rendered as doctrinal 
bodies that were based on a “loose social organization”34 that functioned mainly within 
the confines of regulating the authority of opinions and governing the legal 
understandings of the divine text.35 However, the emergence of the madhhab by the 9th 
and 10th Centuries to a great extent was grounded on more organized forms of doctrinal 
bodies that were guided by the founding fathers and their subsequent followers.36 There 
were greater efforts in the later centuries to organize the structure of the authority of 
different opinions within each madhhab37 and to curtail the efforts of ijtihad expounded 
by qadis and muftis.38 This was largely due to the belief that scholars no longer possessed 
the competence that allowed for the ability to determine which views were correct and 
which were not.39 As such, this called for the need to formulate a set of guiding principles 
to direct the scholars on which opinions to consult.40 
By the 12th Century, there were conflicting views regarding the hierarchy of 
authority in the Hanafi madhhab seeing as that—besides the differing opinions of the 
founding fathers of the madhhab (Abu Hanifa, Abu Yusuf, and Muhammad al-
Shaybani)—there were less authoritative opinions that prevailed within the Hanafi 
doctrine.41 Later scholars proposed different criteria of the hierarchy of authority for 
																																																								
33 Burak, “The Second Formation of Islamic Law,” p. 582. 
34 Ibid., 
35 Ibid., 
36 Ibid., 
37 Ibid. 
38 Peters, “What Does it Mean to Be an Official Madhhab?” p. 149-150. 
39 Ibid., 150. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Peters, “What Does it Mean to Be an Official Madhhab?” p. 149. 
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scholars to adhere to. However, the one that worked its way into the structure of the 
Hanafi madhhab dictated that the first opinion to consult when faced with contradictory 
opinions regarding a certain matter was that of Abu Hanifa, then Abu Yusuf’s, then 
Muhammad al-Shaybani’s, then either that of Zufar or al-Hasan b. Ziyad.42 
It is worth mentioning here that the efforts set forth in the development and 
structure of the Hanafi madhhab were not promoted by state authorities.43 According to 
Burak, the practice of patronage as well as supporting and appointing certain jurists to 
specific positions by the state or the ruler goes back to the Umayyad and ‘Abbasid eras. 
In the reign of the Ayyubids and Mamluks, the state could also adopt one or more schools 
of law.44 However, the degree of state intervention was limited. Burak argues that state 
authorities did not dictate what was to be considered law and what was not. They neither 
interceded in the doctrinal structure of different madhhabs nor regulated the hierarchy of 
the authority of opinions.45 This was fundamentally different from the Ottoman Empire. 
The Ottoman attempts to create a standardized legal system that would contribute to the 
bureaucratic administrative structure of the state dictated different types of practices and 
marked a degree of state intervention in the religious doctrine. Rudolph Peters contends 
that such an inconstant setup of the Hanafi madhhab that was characterized by the 
different conflicting views was difficult to convert into “positive law,” as in rearrange it 
in such a way that was easy to be administered by the qadi courts.46 Nevertheless, he 
argues that the Ottoman efforts of creating a particular type of Hanafism that was well-
																																																								
42 Peters, “What Does it Mean to Be an Official Madhhab?” p. 150. 
43 Burak, “The Second Formation of Islamic Law,” p. 582. 
44 Ibid., 
45 Ibid. 
46 Peters, “What Does it Mean to Be an Official Madhhab?” p. 147. 
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suited to their administrative requirements aided in altering the school’s doctrine from 
one that was marked by contradictions to one that became “more or less homogenous.”47 
The evolution of the Hanafi madhhab after the Ottoman conquests was to a large extent 
interlocked with the Ottoman sultan’s and state authorities’ intervention in the regulation 
and restructuring of the religious doctrine. 48  There are a number of factors that 
contributed to the departure of the Hanafi madhhab from pre-Ottoman to post-Ottoman 
adoption of the particular branch of Hanafism. According to Burak, “institutionally, this 
change was both reflected in and enabled by the development of an imperial learned 
hierarchy with fairly standardized career and training tracks.”49 By the early 15th Century, 
this imperial learned hierarchy was well established and enforced.50  The Ottoman 
authorities regulated the structure of the hierarchy through the appointment of muftis and 
the development of the office of the Grand Mufti (seyhulislam) who was the head of the 
imperial learned hierarchy and whom also played an integral role in regulating a certain 
type of shari’a—or a certain type of Hanafism—that was consistent with the Ottoman 
innovations introduced by the sultan and state authorities.51 Having said that, there is a 
clear divergence here from the classical role muftis played. A mufti in the classical sense 
was a religious expert who gave his fatwa on the basis of questions addressed to him 
regarding legal and religious matters. He contributed to the governance of the religious 
doctrine seeing as that he had the authority to exercise his own independent reasoning 
(ijtihad) in dispensing new injunctions that would guide followers of the madhhab and 
																																																								
47 Peters, “What Does it Mean to Be an Official Madhhab?” p. 147. 
48 Burak, The Second Formation of Islamic Law, p. 10. 
49 Burak, “The Second Formation of Islamic Law,” p. 584. 
50 Burak, The Second Formation of Islamic Law, p. 11. 
51 Ibid. A section in Chapter 2 of this study is dedicated to the office of the Seyhulislam.  
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advise judges in legal rulings.52 Unlike qadis, the appointment of muftis was not a state-
sponsored practice. Rather, the mufti acted as an independent scholarly authority who 
was free from such appointments by the ruler of the community.53  During the Mamluk 
period, a jurist could teach law and dispense fatwas—thus, become a mufti—when 
granted the permission to do so by his mentor.54 This is essentially different from the later 
Ottoman practices where the appointment of the mufti was marked by state 
intervention.55 
Another factor that saw the shift from pre-Ottoman to post-Ottoman practices was 
the establishment of an educational system by the Ottoman Empire as yet another 
innovation that was introduced by the 15th Century alongside the development of an 
imperial learned hierarchy.56 The imperial madrasa system was systematically developed 
by the Ottoman dynasty with a network of teaching institutions that were founded 
throughout the empire. This development later ordained that high-ranking judicial and 
bureaucratic positions required the graduation from the imperial madrasa system 
throughout the empire.57 What separates here the Ottoman practices from previous ones is 
that earlier dynasties’ functions in the learning institutions was in regulating its 
administration and funding. However, the Ottoman dynastic practices went beyond the 
confines of the administrative procedures of the educational institutions. They became 
highly involved in the regulation of the doctrine and curriculum of the madrasa system. 
There was a sultanic decree ordered by Sultan Suleyman in 1556 dictating the texts that 
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were to be studied by the students as well as the order of studying those texts in the 
imperial madrasas.58 Moreover, serving as an extension of the sultan, the Grand Mufti by 
the second half of the 16th Century gave such orders on the specific texts to be studied.59 
In being involved in the regulation of the Hanafi doctrine and curriculum of the 
educational system, the Ottoman authorities were opting for uniformity in the texts to be 
consulted and studied. 
A third aspect that signals the degree of state intervention in the Hanafi doctrine is 
the Ottoman dynastic involvement in the genealogy (tabaqat) of the learned hierarchy 
and the regulation of the madhhab’s authority of opinions. Burak argues that by creating 
a certain chain of authority of the members of the hierarchy and tying them back to the 
founding father of the school, Abu Hanifa, as well as excluding the traditions of certain 
Hanafi jurists in other parts of the empire such as the Arab provinces, the genealogies 
were meant to direct members of the school to specific legal matters that they could 
consult in their judgments.60 Moreover, the Ottoman authorities also intervened in the 
regulation of the Hanafi doctrine in determining which authority of opinion to observe.  
The chain of authority of opinion that prevailed in the 12th Century in the Hanafi 
madhhab was already systematized and well underway by the 16th Century in such a 
manner that it was readily consulted.61 The chain of the prevailing opinions and the most 
authoritative ones became clearly underlined in the Hanafi madhhab. In their letters of 
appointments, qadis were specifically instructed by the Ottoman sultan to follow the most 
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authoritative of the Hanafi opinions.62 If they did otherwise, their sentences would be 
nullified.63 However, the sultan issued a number of decrees enjoining qadis to follow less 
authoritative opinions—thirty-two of those decrees alone were issued in the 16th 
Century.64 Such orders made by the sultan either encouraged preferred opinions of muftis 
of the madhhab or forewent an authoritative opinion over a less authoritative one.65 In 
one of the cases that prompted a sultanic order, the weaker opinion regarding the law of 
qasama was imposed. In the case where a body is found on privately owned property 
with signs indicating a violent murder, the next of kin have the right to demand blood 
money after swearing a number of oaths accusing the owners of the property of the 
murder. Following the opinions of Abu Hanifa and Muhammad al-Shaybani, the 
solidarity group of the owner of the property is held accountable for the payment of the 
blood money, whereas Abu Yusuf maintained the weaker opinion that the actual 
inhabitants of the property were to be held accountable.66 Peters argues that the sultanic 
decree enforced the weaker opinion here in order to “stimulate the vigilance of the 
residents and their diligence in keeping their neighborhood safe, since they themselves 
and not their solidarity group were held liable.”67 	
The Madhhab: From Mamluk to Ottoman  
The Ottoman authorities were faced with a different challenge in the hegemony of the 
Hanafi madhhab after the conquests of the Arab regions in the 16th Century. Earlier in the 
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13th Century, the Mamluk Sultan al-Zahir Baybars initiated the tradition of appointing a 
chief qadi (qadi al-qudat) from each of the Sunni schools of law in Cairo.68 By the 
second half of the 14th Century, this practice had been adopted by several other cities in 
the Arab region.69 It is essential here to understand how this quadruple legal system 
functioned in order to fathom how the Ottoman authorities restructured the administrative 
system in such a way to adapt it to the legal landscape of the newly appropriated Arab 
lands and to bring them in line with the other provinces. 
Sherman Jackson provides an interpretation behind Sultan Baybars’ decision to 
implement a quadruple judicial system. He argues that the Chief Shafi’i Qadi, Ibn bint al-
A’azz, alienated the opinions of jurists belonging to other madhhabs and curtailed the 
enforcement of their rulings, which went against the preference of some of the followers 
of the other madhhabs.70 Thus, it is argued, Sultan Baybars wanted to restrain the power 
of Ibn bint al-A’azz by appointing three other Chief Qadis without officially dismissing 
him seeing as that he enjoyed the support of the public who were mostly affiliated with 
the Shafi’i madhhab.71 However, Yossef Rapoport establishes a different argument that 
focuses on the institutional motive behind Sultan Baybars’ decision rather than the 
political and religious objectives. He underscores two main aspects that could further 
elucidate Baybars’ judicial ruling: the legal system’s need for predictability and 
flexibility.72 He argues that the system had become rigid and too inadaptable and thus 
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needed to be institutionally more flexible with a predictable set of canons to follow.73 The 
reason for this rigidity seemingly goes back to the 12th Century shift from the tradition of 
ijtihad to the tradition of taqlid.74 As mentioned earlier, this adjustment was meant to 
curb the independent reasoning of judges and achieve uniformity in the implementation 
of rulings based on the most authoritative opinions in their respective madhhab.75 
According to Rapoport, “without taqlid, i.e., without the madhhab providing an objective 
basis for legal decisions, judicial actions would have been perceived as inherently 
arbitrary.”76 However, the culture of taqlid did not provide much room for judges to 
adapt the law to new social conditions.77 It was also challenging to introduce new features 
to the doctrine of a madhhab seeing as that judges were specifically decreed in their 
appointments to follow only the rulings of their respective madhhab. 78  This also 
constituted a part of the rigidity of the legal system. For instance, appointing only one 
Chief Qadi from the Shafi’i madhhab entailed that a bride could not add stipulations in 
her marriage contract in accordance to the Shafi’i doctrine; however, the Hanbali doctrine 
allowed it. Marriage of a minor is not permitted in the Shafi’i doctrine but is allowed in 
the Hanafi doctrine.79 Thus, having a quadruple judicial system offered an alternative 
solution to provide more flexibility for the population in raising the doctrines of all four 
Sunni schools to the same equal status even if they chose to follow the culture of taqlid.80 
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Changing the institutional judicial structure in the Mamluk period accommodated 
the social needs of the population by allowing the individual to choose the court forum 
that best suited his/her interest. Ido Shahar refers to the engagement in the interrelations 
of the madhhabs as “forum shopping.” 81  This “forum shopping” was at times a 
mechanism employed by the state through its representatives to prevent certain rulings 
from taking place.82 Shahar provides the example of heresy where a person who is 
accused of heresy could manage for instance to appear before a Shafi’i judge—who 
spares the lives of the heretics who repent—before witnesses go to a Maliki qadi—who 
imposes the capital punishment on heretics—and is thus protected by the manipulation of 
the madhhabs.83 This concept of manipulating the interrelations between madhhabs was 
also extended to other social scenes in regards to property and personal status. According 
to Hanna, a person could purchase a house according to one madhhab and get married or 
divorced the following day according to another madhhab.84 
This legal system did not concur well with the objectives of the Ottoman 
authorities of attempting to enforce standardization and uniformity. The concept of 
“forum shopping” or having room for madhhab manipulation was not a system that could 
contribute to the hegemony of the Hanafi doctrine that the Ottomans were aiming to 
administer. According to Peters, “[the Ottoman state] was motivated by a bureaucratic 
tendency to impose uniformity in the administration of justice based on Hanafi doctrine, 
at the expense of pragmatic flexibility.”85 Their objective was to restructure the legal 
system in such a way that would yield centrality to their administration of justice, even if 																																																								
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that meant introducing features that were met with resistance. Thus, the Ottoman 
authorities cancelled the Mamluk tradition of having a quadruple judicial system and 
replaced it with a single Hanafi Chief Qadi (qadi al-qudat) who was appointed by the 
sultan.86 The qadi who served as the qadi al-qudat was typically a Turk who was not 
fluent in Arabic and communicated through a translator. He was assigned a one-year term 
in Cairo, which was to a degree a prestigious position that helped in elevating him in 
status.87 The restructuring of the judicial system by the Ottoman authorities did not 
necessarily denote that the Hanafi law replaced the other madhhabs. The other Sunni 
schools of law continued to function with each courthouse having a qadi represent each 
madhhab.88 Grasping how this system functioned is of importance here in order to have a 
clearer visualization of how the Ottoman authorities, on the one hand, aimed at creating a 
centralized legal system and how, on the other, it allowed for a degree of flexibility in the 
making of the law.	
Even though the qadis and muftis in the Balkans and Anatolia were instructed to 
only exclusively apply Hanafi law, the case with the newly appropriated Arab regions 
was different wherein the qadis and muftis of other Sunni schools were integrated within 
the system.89 In spite of the Ottoman authorities having abolished the quadruple judicial 
system, there still existed a degree of leeway in administering the legal rulings of other 
madhhabs. There is a difference of opinion within the Hanafi doctrine regarding the 
jurisdiction of qadis and whether it is the right of the defendant or the plaintiff to choose 
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the court forum.90 However, the case was fairly different in the large cities of the Arab 
regions where there were several qadis affiliated with different madhahbs in one place 
and whom also exercised equal jurisdiction.91 Thus, to limit the jurisdiction of qadis to a 
certain extent, the sultan issued a decree through a fatwa by Ebu’s-Su’ud prohibiting 
qadis from hearing cases and passing judgments based on a madhhab that was not the 
defendant’s choice of forum. Sentences that were to be dispensed by qadis against this 
decree would be deemed as void.92 Peters argues that this was probably a method to 
curtail a previous practice in the Arab regions of implementing the Shafi’i doctrine in 
cases where the defendant did not appear before the court.93 However, another distinction 
in the Ottoman practice that aimed at upholding Hanafi law was that even though they 
permitted other non-Hanafi qadis to pass sentences on the basis of the defendant’s 
madhhab, the rulings issued also warranted the approval of the Hanafi qadi—who was 
given precedence among other qadis—for them to be enforced.94 Still, there was a limit to 
the degree of enforcement of non-Hanafi rulings. According to the Hanafi jurists, the 
non-Hanafi sentences had to abide by the basic principles of Qur’an and Hadith.95 There 
were also certain issues that were deemed legal by other madhhabs but could not be 
enforced by Hanafi qadis. One of those issues that were recognized by all madhhabs 
except the Hanafi’s entailed that sentences could be delivered on the basis of an oath by 
the plaintiff and a testimony by one witness.96 Judith Tucker offers an interesting 
example that showcases the Hanafi muftis’ and qadis’ endorsement of non-Hanafi 																																																								
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rulings. She notes that in 17th and 18th Centuries Syria and Palestine, Hanafi jurists 
enforced rulings by Hanbali and Shafi’i qadis and requested they appear in courts when it 
came to the annulment of a marriage due to a husband not providing spousal support to 
his wife on the basis of poverty or because he had disappeared without leaving behind 
sufficient support. This was a case that did not necessitate an annulment of marriage 
based on the Hanafi doctrine; thus, Hanafi jurists were willing to endorse other non-
Hanafi sentences for expediency in annulling marriages on the basis of desertion.97 
It is intriguing to perceive how the Ottoman authorities articulated their own form 
of Hanafism through the interactions with other madhhabs and previous practices that 
yielded a new form of legal structure. The practices and mechanisms employed by the 
Ottoman authorities conveys that in spite of the Ottoman objective of upholding Hanafi 
law as a form of bureaucratic standardization and uniformity, it operated differently when 
it was faced with the legal diversity of the interrelations between the madhhabs in the 
Arab regions. Shahar argues that, “the ruling elites of both empires [Mamluk and 
Ottoman] were cautious not to break the fundamental institutional structure of four 
equally legitimate schools of law.” 98  Thus, the efforts put forth by the Ottoman 
authorities in the restructuring of the judicial system were shaped in such a way as to 
integrate legal pluralism that existed in the Arab region and incorporate it in their policies 
of Ottomanization. 
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II. Kanun As Imperial Law  
To further examine the Ottomanization process of standardizing and centralizing the 
administrative system, it is important to first understand the legal context within which 
the state practices and newly introduced policies took place. The previous section shed 
light on the internal dynamics that were behind the appointment of an official Hanafi 
madhhab and the process of altering a particular form of shari’a with Hanafi 
interpretations that fit well with the vitality of the Ottoman dynasty. Those institutional 
practices that introduced changes to the structure of the official madhhab—as well as 
other administrative practices that will be discussed throughout this study—all fall under 
the rubric of kanun seeing as that those practices materialized either in the form of kanun 
regulations codified by the state authorities or were legitimized by them.99 Another vital 
aspect to briefly address that is of relevance here and the next chapters is the problematic 
dialogue of theory and practice or of law and application. This issue raises several 
questions in regards to which legal codes were applied and the nature of the legal 
administration that developed. This section will thus attempt to showcase the evolution of 
the kanun as a complex legal system that developed independently of the unique 
Ottomanized Hanafi doctrine in order to further understand its relation to shari’a and how 
it structured the Ottoman system of administration.100 
The kanun is considered as one of the most significant innovations of the Ottoman 
legal system.101 State-enacted laws in principle existed before the Ottoman Empire;102 
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however, what distinguished the kanun from other previous state laws were the Ottoman 
authorities early attempts to codify the law and standardize the legal system throughout 
the empire.103 According to Gerber, the promulgation of kanun resulted from the need for 
a bureaucratic state to have a codified legal code that was to be enforced in all its 
provinces.104 The kanunname (often referred to as state law, secular law, dynastic law, 
imperial law, or sultanic law) is a collection of kanun regulations that constitute short 
summaries of sultanic decrees and firmans, which came to be regarded as a distinct 
institutional body of laws that is separate from the shari’a.105 Kanun was used to denote 
several meanings. There were the sultanic decrees that were enacted in regards to specific 
legal matters; there were kanunnames that were issued for specific groups of people or 
for a particular region; and there were the comprehensive kanunnames that were 
implemented on the whole empire.106 Moreover, kanun at times also conveyed the same 
meaning as custom (‘urf) in Ottoman texts by the 16th Century. In such cases, it was often 
associated with the term kadim (old or ancient)—kanun-ı kadim—to symbolize old 
customary practices. 107  This could be viewed as a sort of affirmation that kanun 
confirmed local customary practices, and certain kanun regulations were referred to as 
“accepted [or] local usage.”108 
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The kanun propagated by the sultan was essentially meant to be valid for the 
period of his reign, but could be revoked or renewed by his successors.109 However, most 
kanuns were confirmed seeing as that they were often regarded as common existing 
practices and were not changed unless there were fundamental political, social, or 
economic changes or if a sultan decided to dissolve certain kanun regulations that he 
deemed as religious innovations.110 Furthermore, the most closely linked office to the 
imperial kanuns was that of the nişancı.111 He operated the administrative functions of 
authenticating the tuğra (imperial seal) and other official documents.112 The nişancı dealt 
with the process of validating the kanuns by drafting them and checking their consistency 
and correctness with other previous kanuns.113 He would then validate them by first 
officially presenting them to the sultan and when he received his approval he would affix 
them with the tuğra and they became law.114 Often when the seyhulislam or a mufti had 
inquiries regarding what the kanun was considering a certain matter they would turn to 
the nişancı for legal information.115 After the kanunname had been validated, it was sent 
out to qadis and provincial governors to administer it116 (sometimes at the request of 
qadis) with strict regulations to administer justice “in accordance with the noble shari’a 
and the exalted kanun.”117 However, when it came to capital or corporal punishments, 
they were instructed to administer them “in accordance with the imperial kanunname.”118 
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The kanun generally dealt with topics that were not touched upon by the 
shari’a.119 Mehemd II (1451-81)—also known as Mehmed the Conqueror—was the first 
sultan to enact laws that sought universal application and were regarded as a distinct body 
of laws separate from the shari’a.120 He was responsible for the promulgation of two 
separate kanun collections; one that generally dealt with the bureaucratic structure of the 
state and the organization of the official posts of the class of ulama and his executive 
officials; the other dealt with taxation and fines.121 Furthermore, the more general set of 
sultanic laws dealt with fiscal, criminal, and land laws.122 Those laws were later subject to 
a series of modifications under Mehmed II’s successor Bayzeid II (1481-1512), who 
renewed and enacted more comprehensive decrees.123 However, it was not until the reign 
of Suleyman al-Kanuni that the kanun witnessed its greatest achievements. He was 
known for his promulgation of many strict sultanic decrees and for the establishment of a 
more developed and inclusive penal code.124 It was also during his reign that Sultan 
Suleyman sought to homogenize the kanun with the shari’a and was aided by his 
seyhulislam, Ebu’s-Su’ud, in the attempts of reconciling both legal codes.125 A new 
kanunname with more modifications and additions, titled Kanun-i ‘Osmani, was enacted 
in 1534 under the reign of al-Kanuni.126 
By order of Sultan Suleyman, a copy of his new kanunname and Bayzeid’s were 
to be placed in the courts of all towns across the empire.127 However, implementing the 
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kanunname in every province did not necessarily entail the nullification of provincial pre-
existing legal codes. To steer clear of any disorders from arising from the introduction of 
new Ottoman policies to the local administrative systems, the Ottoman authorities did not 
abolish the laws or the local customs and traditions. This was also due to the fear of 
changes affecting tax revenues.128 Thus, there were general surveys conducted in every 
sancaks (“the basic administrative unit of the Ottoman Empire”)129 throughout the 16th 
Century.130 Those tax and population surveys aimed at keeping in check the tax revenues 
and statuses of different groups in each given sancak and also precipitated the enactment 
of new laws.131 The process of drafting the kanunname for each sancak based on the 
survey and registration of the population entailed the commissioner of the survey to 
eliminate certain local practices and traditions that contradicted the shari’a or kanun and 
to send the rest of them to the sultan for his approval.132 Moreover, the sancak surveys 
were also detrimental in establishing the administrative system in a given region because 
problems at times arose and complaints of local groups of people or the need to increase 
tax revenue called for the commissioner of the survey to recommend the sultan to revise 
or abolish certain laws.133 Under the reign of Bayzeid II, it had become common usage to 
start the survey registers of each sancak with its local kanunname that would aid in the 
settlement of disputes.134 However, even though each sancak had its own kanunname, it 
was established that they must also adhere to the general kanunname of the empire 
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(kanun-i osmani).135 The kanunname of Egypt of 1525 provides a good example here. It 
was divided into different chapters that detailed the administrative system and its 
hierarchy, which identify who the governor of Egypt is, the administrators of the smaller 
provinces within Egypt, the Ottoman military units, and finally the taxes that Egypt was 
due to pay.136 Additionally, it specified what the duties of the governor were and the 
overall legal and fiscal system of the province.137 Attached with the kanunname of Egypt 
was the survey registry that was conducted for this particular region.138 Moreover, a copy 
of the kanunname of Egypt was instructed to be placed in the Divan of Egypt and sent out 
to every qadi to publicize it in his district.139 This underpins the extent of the Ottoman 
bureaucratization attempts in creating a uniform administrative system and integrating 
kanun in the process of law making and instilling its bureaucratic character throughout 
the empire. For instance, in the preface of the kanunname of Egypt—seeing as that 
crimes had increased overtime—it was declared that “disputes and feuds can no longer be 
decided by the swords of the tongue of the guardians of the holy law [i.e. the qadis], but 
require the tongue of the sword of those empowered to inflict heavy punishment [i.e. non-
shari’a judges].”140 This portrays one of the ways of how kanun was introduced as a 
necessity to regulate the legal process and administer justice. Hence, it enjoined that 
anyone who commits a crime must be punished by both the kanun and the shari’a.141 
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Sultan Suleyman is known to have developed the most comprehensive body of 
criminal regulations in the kanun-i osmani.142 According to Gerber, it was “the final and 
most important version of the Ottoman penal kanun.”143 There were many new additions 
in this version of kanunname in the field of criminal law seeing as that one of the 
objectives was to create a series of legislations alongside that of the shari’a’s for criminal 
procedures. However, the main objective was to protect the society against the oppressive 
actions of the executive officials.144 Thus, when Sultan Suleyman initiated the series of 
kanun reforms, he aimed at curbing the power exercised by his executive officials in 
administering justice by placing the qadi in charge of overseeing their criminal 
proceedings.145 Another objective that is found in the preambles of the kanunname was to 
prevent injustices from being committed. Consequently, people had to be familiar with 
the kanunname to know what rights they possessed. That being so, qadis and governors 
were commonly instructed to read out the kanunname in public and it was also made 
available for purchase in the 16th and 17th Centuries.146 
There was a certain gap in the way some crimes were dealt with and there were no 
comprehensive legal provisions to enforce punishments in cases that created ambiguity. 
However, with the kanunnames of Sultan Suleyman and his predecessors on criminal 
punishments, the state played an integral role in the way justice was administered as it 
now had covered a broad range of criminal transgressions.147 The kanun had thus come to 
act as a form of law enforcement.148 One of the main features of its criminal code is that 																																																								
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many punishments became “fiscalized.”149 Besides the ta’zir punishments that were 
administered, a fine (ta’zir bi’l-mal)150 was prescribed usually depending on the number 
of strokes that were assigned.151 The payment of a fine was considered to be one of the 
innovations introduced by the Ottoman authorities. In addition to the fines, punishments 
also took the shape of banishments, flogging, public scorn, and imprisonment. 152 
Monetary fines in particular were not known to the criminal regulations of the shari’a 
and were considered by some ulama as an unlawful form of state revenue.153 However, 
this form of punishment, besides ta’zir, were prescribed in most of the articles of the 
Ottoman criminal code when it came to crimes of sexual transgressions, theft, drinking of 
wine, bodily harm and killing, and other criminal provisions.154 Fines seem to have been 
the favored form of penalty for regular crimes. It is argued that this was due to the fact 
that fines generated revenue for the state the same way taxes did.155 Yet, this criminal 
penalty was abused by some of the executive officials who illicitly extorted fines. 
However, under one of the articles of the Ottoman criminal code, one of the protective 
functions of the qadis was to reclaim the fines illegally collected by the executive 
officials.156 In the kanunname of Aintab of 1536, it reads, “For every crime that occurs, 
no matter how great or small, [the penalty] shall be decided with reference to the 
Ottoman Kanun. Force shall not be used to exact anymore than that.”157 This depicts the 
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tight control kanun had in administering justice and how it aimed at protecting the people 
against injustices caused by the executive officials. 
However, unlike modern criminal law, criminals were also subject to other forms 
of punishments for acts that were not addressed in the kanunname with prescribed 
penalties. Crimes that were not alluded to in the kanunname could be punished at the 
discretion of the qadi or executive officials through administering ta’zir or siyaset 
punishments.158 Ta’zir and siyaset punishments were two of the most commonly used 
legal principles in the kanun and constitute pivotal elements in the making of Ottoman 
law. There are differences in the objectives of both forms of punishments. Ta’zir was 
meant to reform the acts of the offender and deter any future offences, while the objective 
of the siyaset punishments was to “protect society from persons whose acts constitute a 
danger to law and order.”159 The discretionary punishments of ta’zir were within the 
jurisdiction of both the qadi and the executive officials, while the siyaset punishments 
were the authority of the sultan and his executive officials. 160  Moreover, ta’zir 
punishments were administered in cases of crimes that transgressed the shari’a while the 
siyaset punishments were administered under the will of the sultan of “any act threatening 
public order.”161 Even though the siyaset punishments were long embedded in the 
Muslim states long before the conquests of the Ottoman Empire, they had grown a more 
Ottomanized character and the concept of siyasa shari’ya was integrated within the 
kanunname and administrative documents. Besides the enforcement of ta’zir 
punishments, the siyaset punishments took a more extra-legal form in the administration 
																																																								
158 Peters, Crime and Punishment, p. 74. 
159 Ibid., p. 68. 
160 Ibid., 
161 Ibid. 
38		
of justice. Siyaset were referred to capital or severe corporal punishments, which varied 
from execution, cutting off the hand, beard, male organs, nose, public scorn, to branding 
of the forehead.162 Besides discretionary punishments administered by the qadi and the 
prescribing of fines or strokes when it comes to criminal transgressions, the siyaset 
punishments came to form a separate code of law called siyasetname that existed as early 
as Bayzeid II’s reign.163 However, it was later added with Mehmed II’s criminal code. 
Despite being integrated within the text of the kanunname, the siyasetname had not lost 
its separate character. The third chapter of kanun-i osmani covers crimes that are dealt 
with siyaseten.164 Those capital punishments often covered habitual crimes that were 
classified under the concept of “sa’in fi’l-ard bi’l-fasad—the fomenter of corruption in 
the world.”165 This concept of sai bil’-fasad was expanded by the Ottoman authorities 
and came to constitute a legal principle in the kanun.166 According to Gerber, “people in 
Bursa were condemned to death on legal principles characteristic of the kanun system, 
such as siyaset and sai bil’-fasad.”167 
Just as there were kanun regulations that prescribed siyaset punishments to be 
administered by the executive officials, there were also, as mentioned earlier, regulations 
that were meant to keep the power exercised by the executive officials in that area in 
check. The Ottoman Criminal Code dictates that if a qadi examines the facts of a case and 
could not establish enough evidence for him to enforce a sentence in accordance with the 
shari’a, he is then entitled to produce a certificate (huccet) wherein he records and details 																																																								
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all the facts of the case without suggesting a specific sentence. The qadi would then hand 
it over to the executive officials who would in turn produce a punishment siyaseten.168 
Nonetheless, the qadi still exercised the authority to investigate a case and prove the ill 
repute of a suspect before the officials could administer torture or imprison him 
siyaseten.169 Despite bearing a separate character than that of the kanun, there are 
similarities that could be drawn between siyasa shari’ya and kanun. They both administer 
punishments that go beyond penalties prescribed by the shari’a. They both could convict 
and punish a suspect who is ill reputed and has a record of offences. They also allow for a 
testimony of a person who the shari’a deems as incompetent, and they permit the 
imprisonment and torture of a suspect in order to extract confessions. Thus, Heyd argues, 
“the penal kanun [was] a realization, at least partial, of [the] idea of siyasa shari’ya or 
siyasa ‘adila.”170 
The evolution of kanun introduced a standardized legal system that was to a 
degree mindful of pre-existing practices and traditions to an empire that constituted a 
large array of different provincial enforcement agencies and judicial domains. It was far 
reaching in the sense that it regulated new aspects in the lives of the public by entering 
the realm of crimes and sexuality in a different manner than was regulated by the shari’a. 
The emergence of the state’s bureaucratic and administrative system could be argued was 
a product of kanun. The Ottoman authorities attempted to restructure the state’s 
administration in a way that would yield a more efficient administration of justice and 
aimed at utilizing the kanun as a protective function against injustices. It also served as a 
tool to standardize the law of procedure as well as employed certain principles in their 																																																								
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system of administration that gave certain extra-legal actions legitimacy. As such, the 
kanun came to form the integral element of the making of Ottoman law and was often the 
device resorted to for the introduction of Ottomanized policies and innovations. 
The  Kanun-Shari’a Discourse  
Understanding how kanun developed in nature as a distinct body of laws makes it less 
challenging for one to grasp the broad and complex relationship between kanun and 
shari’a. The kanun-shari’a discourse has been the subject of extensive scholarly work 
and there have been many attempts to contextualize the relationship of both codes of law 
and examine how they altered the Ottoman polity. As previously mentioned, the kanun in 
principle as state-enacted law was not in itself an innovation; however, it was the practice 
of the law that the Ottoman authorities developed and the areas that it touched upon that 
was unprecedented.171 Moreover, it was how the Ottoman kanun was instigated and 
implemented vis-à-vis the shari’a that distinguished it from other legal systems. Often the 
literature that exists on the kanun-shari’a rhetoric is either divided on whether the kanun 
had indeed supplemented the shari’a or superseded it in practice. One school of thought 
follows the rhetoric that they were indeed in line with one another, while the other is of 
the opposing opinion.172 However, when examining the Ottoman legal discourse the 
broad understanding of the relationship between kanun and shari’a had often been 
approached as one that yielded tangible tensions. There were many attempts, nonetheless, 
to portray the consolidative nature of both legal systems as one that was smooth and in 
harmony. 
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The tensions between kanun and shari’a were most notable when it came to the 
field of criminal proceedings. Kanun often dealt with cases concerning public law and 
promulgated laws that regulated the relationship between the public and the state. Those 
were aspects that were not necessarily unequivocally covered in the shari’a. However, 
when it came to criminal law and the administration of justice, the shari’a had explicit 
regulations that pinpointed different types of punishments for specific given crimes. In 
spite of this, the kanun interfered in matters of criminal proceedings and introduced new 
regulations that operated outside the workings of the shari’a.173 In theory, the kanun was 
meant to reaffirm shari’a practices and legal decisions. Indeed, this was the case when it 
came to some codified or non-codified laws. In several instances, the kanun legally 
conformed to penalties laid down by the shari’a by reiterating in wording that a crime 
shall be punished “in accordance with the shari’a;” at other times, the kanun adhered to 
the prescribed punishments of the shari’a without necessarily restating so.174 However, 
there are many other cases that depict the extent of the divergence of the kanun from the 
shari’a. It was earlier revealed that the kanun prescribed monetary fines as a form of 
penalty. This was something that was at odds with the shari’a, especially given that those 
fines were at times administered to cases that necessitated hudud punishments under the 
shari’a. However, in order not to supersede the hudud punishments, it was at times 
specified that fines were to be implemented only in cases where the given shari’a 
punishment was not administered, except this was not necessarily always the case.175 
When it came to capital or severe corporal punishments (siyaset punishments), the 
kanun prescribed hudud penalties but not for cases that necessitate them. For instance, 																																																								
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there are several crimes that were punishable by the amputation of the hand siyaseten—a 
penalty prescribed for theft under the shari’a—such as “knifing people habitually and for 
habitually forging decrees of legal certificates.”176 There were other types of siyaset 
punishments that were unfamiliar to the shari’a such as castration, branding of the 
forehead, branding of a woman’s vulva, cutting off the ear and nose, and other forms of 
penalties for different offences. However, the most commonly prescribed penalty was the 
monetary fine even for cases that required the hadd punishment. The hudud punishments 
were not the go-to forms of chastisement that was often employed by the state 
authorities.177 
Gerber argues that the kanun is both a confirmation and a violation of the shari’a. 
It’s a confirmation in the sense that it endorses the hudud punishments as state laws; yet, 
it violates the concept of huquq Allah when it preserves that murder is also a state law 
seeing as its not one of the hudud Allah.178 It is a daunting process to fully attempt to 
come to terms with what the Ottomans wished to achieve by enacting kanun. However, 
there is the point of contention that is often raised in regards to the issue of political and 
religious legitimacy. The Ottoman authorities aimed to create kanun as a symbol of 
justice—something which resonates throughout the preambles and articles of the 
kanunname in one way or another that the main aim was to protect the common people. 
The Ottomans’ political legitimacy became hinged on this notion of justice.179 
When it came to the religious legitimacy of the kanun, however, it was not a 
leveled subject empty of debate. In the process of Ottoman law making, the imperial 
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learned hierarchy became integrated in the system of administration in such a way that 
deemed it at times difficult and at times easy to consolidate the tensions between kanun 
and shari’a. Some ulama where at odds with the kanun and questioned its necessity 
seeing as that they believed that the shari’a was sufficient. On the other hand, other 
jurists believed that kanun was beneficial for the welfare (maslaha) of the society and 
that so long as it did not contradict the shari’a, there was no harm in the sultanic 
enforcement of those laws.180 The tensions usually materialized when it came to certain 
kanun regulations that introduced innovations that were in clear contradiction with the 
shari’a,181 such as interest charging (riba).182 
According to Ze’evi, “conscious of their state’s image as upholder of eternal 
justice, heads of the judiciary in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries found ingenious 
ways to resolve the differences [between shari’a and kanun].”183 What is important here 
is to address the relevancy of the emergence of an imperial learned hierarchy and the 
appointment of the official Hanafi madhhab that’s doctrine was so closely regulated by 
the state to the legitimacy of the kanun. Those two developments were a product of 
sultanic decrees; yet, Ottoman jurists were closely involved in the process of the making 
of Ottoman law.184 The emergence of both the learned hierarchy and the kanun were 
closely aligned.185 The process of creating an imperial learned hierarchy through the 
regulation of a specific curriculum studied at the madrasa and the hierarchy of 
genealogies to be sought out as well as defined career and training tracks created a class 
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of ulama that became so closely tied to the state. It grew accustomed to the state 
intervention and was accepting of state practices. Thus, this “spirit of accommodation” 
facilitated the readiness of the learned hierarchy to cooperate with the Ottoman 
authorities.186 This was particularly true with the case of the seyhulislam whose role, 
alongside that of the fatwa, was detrimental to Ottoman law making and to the religious 
legitimacy of both the sultan and the state, especially in the 16th Century.187 Thus, when it 
came to validating the authority of the kanun, it was the seyhulislam who the sultan often 
turned to in order to issue fatwa that kneaded its permissibility.188 This was especially the 
case when it came to extra-shari’a regulations. 
It is important to note here that the broader objective of kanun was to standardize 
the Ottoman legal system and create a uniform law of procedure that would bring all the 
Ottoman provinces in line with one another. It also served as a tool to reassert the power 
of the central authority and to regulate the core-periphery relations. However, in doing so, 
the kanun was often at odds with the shari’a. Thus, the lines between both were often 
blurred; but to only approach both legal systems as either conflicting or not becomes an 
overly normative attempt to place the kanun within the confines of the shari’a and not as 
a system that developed independently of its own. It is only fitting to treat kanun as a 
complex legal system that at times co-existed with the shari’a and at times it did not. At 
times it violated it and at times it did not. What must be considered here is not the 
division of the literature on this subject, but the efforts and attempts of reconciliation, 
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accommodation, and the creation of a “common vocabulary”189 as a form of political 
expediency; the innovative policies that were the products of kanun; the restructuring of 
the system of administration; and finally the molding of the Ottoman legal system. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE AGENCIES OF THE STATE 	
By outlining the development process of the making of Ottoman law, it becomes less 
challenging to develop a canonical framework within which to place the changes that 
took place in the Ottoman legal administration. In order to understand the workings of the 
Ottoman legal system and to what extent was law applied in practice, it is essential to first 
grasp the setup of the Ottoman bureaucratic state. Besides the incorporation of new 
frontiers, the Ottoman Empire absorbed a large number of people with different identities 
and different backgrounds. With this degree of fluidity and lack of defined boundaries 
came new challenges. How was it that the Ottoman state was going to maintain such a 
large-scale empire over such a long period of time? The previous chapter was one attempt 
to answer this question; that through the development of a more comprehensive code of 
law, the Ottomans aimed to achieve standardization and uniformity. But the question that 
remains here is by which means did they administer such a state? This chapter aims at 
identifying the main constituents of the bureaucratic structure that had the most 
substantial impact in the administration of the Ottoman Empire and that were some of its 
most important representatives. It will showcase how the bureaucratic setup of the state 
was grounded in the concepts of legitimacy and justice and how the more elaborated state 
institutions that were developed asserted the legitimation of the Ottoman administration. 
I. The Sultan  
The role of the sultan in the Ottoman administration served as the basic foundation of the 
bureaucratic structure of the state. His capacity as the chief administrator of the empire 
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was rooted in his capacity to enforce his rulership.190 The principal function of the sultan 
was his leadership in conquest. He used to lead the military campaigns and direct the 
strategies in person. This image of warrior-sultan was often celebrated, which was more 
of a real rather than a symbolic notion until the predecessors of Sultan Suleyman I 
abandoned the practice of leading the military campaigns themselves.191 This in part was 
due to the impracticality of the sultan to lead the battlefield with such largely extended 
frontiers and the prolonged period of the military campaigns as well as the growing 
necessity that called for the presence of the sultan in the imperial capital.192 
Moreover, the notion of leadership was also employed when it came to sultanic 
claims over rulership. According to the Hanafi doctrine, a leader asserted his legitimacy 
when he proved his capacity to seize and exercise power.193 The Ottoman sultans lay 
claim to such legitimacy when they proclaimed themselves leaders of the holy wars 
waged against the infidels. Thus, the territories conquered from the infidels were 
rightfully theirs.194 However, a problem arose when it came to territories usurped from 
the Seljuks. To reassert their legitimacy over lands seized from Muslims, they claimed 
that the last sultan of the Seljuk dynasty appointed as his successor the first Ottoman 
sultan, making the Ottoman dynasty the heirs to Seljuk lands195. However, the wars 
waged later against the Mamluks and the Safavids of Iran were a lot less subtle. The 
Ottoman sultans thus claimed their leadership as the most powerful defenders of Islam 
and shari’a by waging the wars against the infidels and the heretics. This entitlement to 																																																								
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sovereignty was later much more expanded on with the conquests of the 16th Century led 
by Sultan Suleyman I.196 Those claims were further broadened to include universal 
sovereignty of the sultan—which was in itself an Ottoman innovation. It was Ebu’s-
Su’ud who formulated those claims that gave Sultan Suleyman the prerogatives to 
universal sovereignty, which were commemorated in the inscription above the portal of 
his mosque.197 Colin Imber quotes this inscription that reads: 
“[Sultan Suleyman] has drawn near to [God], the Lord of Majesty and 
Omnipotence, / the Creator of the World of Dominion and Sovereignty, / 
[Sultan Suleyman] who is His slave, made mighty with Divine Power, / 
the Caliph, resplendent with Divine Glory, / Who performs the Command 
of the Hidden Book / and executes its Decrees in [all] regions of the 
inhabited quarter: / Conqueror of the Lands of the Orient and the Occident 
/ with the Help of Almighty God and His Victorious Army, / Possessor of 
the Kingdoms of the World, Shadow of God over all Peoples, Sultan of the 
Sultans of the Arabs and the Persians, / Promulgator of Sultanic Qanuns, / 
Tenth of the Ottoman Khaqans, / Sultan son of the Sultan, Sultan 
Suleyman Khan / … / May the line of his Sultanate endure until the End of 
the Line of the Ages!/…”198 
 
Those sultanic characteristics and attributes of a sovereign ruler were reassertions that 
first and foremost the sultan’s legitimacy to rulership was drawn from the classical notion 
of divine right as the sultan came to be considered God’s viceregent on earth who had 
rightful claims to universal sovereignty.199 Secondly, they also credited the sultan with 
the right to secular sovereignty that he gained through conquests.200 Finally, he was seen 
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as the enforcer of the shari’a and kanun, which endowed him with the authority of a 
legislator.201 
When it came to administering the government, the sultan’s scope of power in 
theory was usually limited to four specific areas of legal authority according to Hanafi 
theory, which covered “Friday prayer, taxation, the fifth on war booty and the fixed 
penalties.”202 However, in practice, the authority that the Ottoman sultan exercised went 
beyond the confines of those four spheres. This was in part due to the fact that the sultan 
decreed kanuns that dealt with other legal areas such as land, fiscal, and criminal laws.203 
In addition to his sultanic decrees, he exercised extra-legal forms of authority that were 
meant to ensure the welfare of the public. Friday prayer was one example showing the 
tight control of the sultan’s administration. Either the sultan or his delegate would lead 
the Friday prayers and the imam or the preacher of the mosques in the towns and cities of 
the Ottoman provinces who were appointed by the government exalted the sultan’s name 
in their speeches. This further laid claims to the sovereignty of the sultan over his 
people.204 Moreover, even in cases where the government-appointed-preacher could not 
lead the Friday prayer, it was only through a sultanic decree and a fatwa from Ebu’s-
Su’ud that authorized the preacher to appoint a deputy to lead the prayers. Another aspect 
that showcases the extent of the sultan’s authority was that the Festival and Friday 
prayers could only be held in places authorized by the sultan. He did not, for instance, 
permit them to be held in villages.205 
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One of the basic functions of the Ottoman administration was to accumulate 
revenue,206 and this was mostly achieved through taxation. Given the importance of such 
function, taxation fell under the jurisdiction of the imperial authority.207 However, the 
taxes the sultan obtained often did not correspond with the Hanafi doctrine. This practice 
began to pose a problem starting the 15th Century when an Ottoman scholar authored a 
treatise declaring the illegality of the revenue raised from customs and land tenure by the 
sultan and called for the adherence to the shari’a.208 However, it was Ebu’s-Su’ud who 
attempted to reconcile Ottoman taxation practices with the doctrine of the shari’a by 
restating some concepts that he borrowed from the Hanafi doctrine.209 Moreover, the 
spoils of war was a third area that was considered to be under the sultan’s authority. 
According to Hanafi law, the sultan was entitled to the fifth of the war booty and the rest 
was to be handed over to individuals after the sultan took his share. This was considered 
to be another form of revenue for the sultan and his subjects.210 However, an issue arose 
in regards to the legality of the ownership of goods and slaves appropriated from war. 
People posed questions asking Ebu’s-Su’ud for the lawfulness of war booty raised from 
wars against Muslims or against Christians whom the sultan had formulated treaties with 
to which he answers with a reassertion of the sultan’s authority and licit practices and 
eliminated any impediments to the appropriation of war booty from such wars.211 
The fourth area that was also within the sultan’s control was the fixed penalties 
assigned to hudud punishments, which were: “fornication, false accusation of fornication, 																																																								
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wine-drinking, theft, and highway robbery.”212 Those crimes were seen as transgressing 
haqq Allah and it was the sultan’s duty to enforce their punishments. However, in reality, 
it was only the offence of highway robbery where the fixed penalty was enforced and was 
later broadened to include other crimes that were thought to threaten the welfare of 
society such as brigandage, which was very common in the countryside.213 When it came 
to other crimes that incurred the fixed penalties it was a rather grey area seeing as that 
crimes such as fornication and drinking of wine were difficult to prove. Thus, the practice 
of executing such penalties fell under the authority of the sultan.214 However, even in 
cases where the fixed penalty was not employed, there were other forms of deterrence 
that came to form a symbolic element of the sultan’s administration of criminal acts. 
Right before leading his military campaigns, the sultan often issued decrees for the 
closure of wine-shops. Such act was believed could evoke divine assistance during the 
war.215 What is more interesting is that during the reign of Sultan Suleyman I, coffee-
shops, like wine-shops, were also banned. Coffee was believed to be an intoxicant that 
posed dangers for the public order and threatened the morality of the society.216 There 
was a fatwa issued by Ebu’s-Su’ud regarding this issue, stating that: “How can anyone 
consume this reprehensible [substance], which dissolute men drink when engaged in 
games and debauchery?”217 
This establishes the fact that religion played an important role in the authority and 
legitimacy of the sultan. Besides the exercise of coercive measures demonstrated in the 
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sultan’s military campaigns and conquests, religion also served as a tool of power 
assertion whereas the sultan could not effectively guarantee his legitimacy without 
maintaining a religious image, even if it was only symbolic. It was in part through 
religion that a sultan could gain the acceptance and the obedience of his people, 
especially with a population whom the majority of were Muslims.218 Thus, religion came 
to form an important feature in the sultan’s administration. As seen earlier, the sultan’s 
claims to legitimacy rested above all on rulership through divine right. Religion was a 
central aspect in the relationship between the sultan and his subjects. Hakan T. Karateke 
contends that people wished to view their sultan as religious even if they themselves were 
not, seeing as that “the subject saw the ruler as a kind of intermediary between God and 
himself, facilitating the achievement of his own ambitions.”219 This in turn could benefit 
the sultan in terms of securing the subservience of his people.220 However, according to 
Karateke, it was insufficient for a ruler to only possess religious attributes, but for his rule 
to also be portrayed as such.221 This meant that it was important to have institutions and 
certain acts that backed up the sultan’s religiosity.222 One aspect of this was the sultan’s 
efforts—especially those of Sultan Suleyman I—to reconcile the kanun with the shari’a; 
the aim to amalgamate the administrative laws with the religious laws were seen as 
attempts that to an extent grounded the religious legitimacy of the sultan.223 It was also 
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under Sultan Suleyman I that the religious institutions reached their most developed 
stage.224 
There were other attempts to advocate the religiosity of the sultan to the public. 
The sultan’s leadership in waging holy wars against infidels was one angle of the 
religious rhetoric. Another way of promoting the sultan’s religious character was his 
procession to Friday prayers and the order of transporting holy relics from Mecca to the 
capital. There were other such deeds that portrayed this image of the sultan. However, 
one of the most significant measures taken to retain his religious figure was gaining the 
title of “servitor of the two Holy Sanctuaries”—hadim al-haramayn—after the conquests 
of the Arab provinces of 1516-17.225 Sultan Selim I had thus embraced this Mamluk title 
after the conquests, which changed the religious identity of the Ottoman sultan.226 Inspite 
of the fact that no Ottoman sultan actually ever went to Mecca,227 yet the title gave them 
prestige among the Muslim community and further heightened the legitimacy of their 
rulership as the “rightful leaders of the Hijaz.”228 Nonetheless, those rights also charged 
them with a magnitude of services that they had to maintain. They became involved with 
the maintenance of buildings and holy sites as well as the restoration of the Holy Mosque 
in Mecca.229 The most important of those services, however, was securing the caravans of 
pilgrims heading to Mecca from robbers and Bedouins and supplying them with other 
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essentials. En route to the Hijaz, water fountains were built, Bedouins who were in 
control of springs were paid off, and food was subsidized during the pilgrimage and when 
the pilgrims reached the Hijaz.230 However costly was the maintenance of such duties, the 
extent of this religious authority was of great significance to the “imperial ideology” and 
to the image that the sultan retained as leader and Caliph of the Muslim community.231 It 
further aided in the unity of the old and new territories of the empire under the religious 
zeal of the sultan.232 	
The Image of Justice  
Justice formed yet another constitutive rhetoric of the sultan’s sovereignty over his 
subjects. The classical notion of justice was retained in the age of the Ottoman sultans. 
They regarded themselves as “guardians of God’s country against oppression and 
tyranny…and dispensers of justice.”233 This image of the sultan as a just ruler came to 
form a very crucial element in his administration both in terms of legitimacy and as 
protector of the people against injustices. The sovereignty bestowed upon him entitled 
him to rule justly and enact laws that would ensure the fair administration of justice.234 
Anything else that exhausts the enforcement of just laws would impair his sovereignty. 
With such great emphasis placed on retaining justice, the sultan went through great 
measures to ensure that his administration was structured in such a way that would secure 
that justice was fairly dispensed.235 One of the main functions of a just ruler was to 
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protect his people against the abuse caused by his executive authorities. Thus, he was 
regarded as a sort of “safe-keeping” “supreme power” that safeguarded his people against 
the exploitative actions of his officials.236 Moreover, the sultan regulated justice through 
his civil and religious administrations. His two executive officials responsible for the two 
administrations were his grand Vizier and seyhulislam. They were the two main 
representatives of the sultan’s civil and religious authorities and would ensure that the 
sultan’s just rule was effectively implemented.237 Furthermore, the sultan would enact 
edicts called adalet-names that served as a reminder for his executive officials to not 
commit any acts of injustices against the public.238 There was also an established network 
of agents who were dispersed amongst the public to monitor acts of injustices. The sultan 
himself would at times go undercover on secret tours to reveal any abuses taking place.239 
Earlier on during the reign of the Abbasids, the Caliph did not exercise the right 
of legislating outside the confines of the shari’a. Even when he did enact laws, he coined 
them as a form of administration rather than legislation that served the purposes of the 
shari’a.240 The Ottoman sultans on the other hand were a lot less subtle in their process of 
legislation. However, there were greater attempts made in harmonizing the kanun with 
the shari’a, even when the administrative laws were clearly outside the bounds of the 
shari’a.241 This was particularly true in the reign of Sultan Suleyman I. He was the most 
celebrated sultan as the upholder of justice. He was glorified as the legislator (al-Kanuni) 
for championing the kanun and for his keenness in asserting the supremacy of the law as 																																																								
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well as for creating the most comprehensive kanunname.242 With more laws being 
legislated, there were greater measures taken to maintain that the main aims of such 
legislations were the welfare of the public and to protect the people against injustices 
caused by executive officials or judges.243 This was one way of strengthening the sultan’s 
centralistic hold and establishing a bureaucracy that ensured standardization and 
uniformity throughout the empire. With more considerable endeavors set forth by Sultan 
Suleyman I in establishing the authority of the law, he came to be considered as the 
embodiment of justice and as a “law-abiding ruler.”244 
Furthermore, Sultan Suleyman undertook a series of actions when he first 
ascended the throne that was aimed at securing the welfare of his subjects. He freed 
deportees who were forcefully brought to the capital by his father Sultan Selim I.245 He 
returned the silk goods seized from Iranian and Ottoman merchants after Sultan Selim I 
had issued a ban on them. He also ordered the execution of certain officials who served 
under the reign of his predecessor and who were known to having committed injustices 
against the people and other such acts that underpinned “his time of justice.”246 Those 
efforts further idealized Sultan Suleyman I’s achievements in creating a centralistic 
administration and were enough reason for his reign to be reckoned as the empire’s 
Golden Age.247 In 1595, Sultan Mehmed III proclaimed that, “formerly Sultan Suleyman 
Khan—may God place him in the highest if the paradises—in his days of justice 																																																								
242  Inalcik, Halil. “Suleiman the Lawgiver and Ottoman Law,” in Islamic Political Thought and 
Governance: Critical Concepts in Political Science, Volume II. Eds. Abdullah Saeed. New 
York: Routledge, 2011, p.57. 
243 Heyd, Studies in old Ottoman Criminal Law, p. 3 and Inalcik, “State, Sovereignty and Law,” p. 63. 
244 Inalcik, “Suleiman the Lawgiver and Ottoman Law,” p. 60 and Yilmaz, M. Sakir. “Crime and 
Punishment in the Imperial Historiography of Suleyman the Magnificent: An Evaluation of Nisanci 
Celalzade's View.” Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, Vol. 60, No. 4 (2007): 430. 
245 Inalcik, “State, Sovereignty and Law,” p. 64. 
246 Ibid., 63-4. 
247 Ibid., 76. 
57		
enforcement had imperial codes (Kanunnames) written and placed in the courts of the 
kadis, and since they had compiled with its content, no one suffered injustice and 
oppression and everything was taken care of the best way, and the subjects who are a 
trust by God lived in peace and prosperity.”248 To what extent this was true is a point of 
contention; however, it aids to demonstrate how Sultan Suleyman I was celebrated as a 
just ruler. 
Fratricide and Siyaset Punishments  
Even though there was a lot of emphasis placed on retaining the image of the sultan as a 
just ruler and there were times where people turned to the bureaucratic state as the 
dispenser of justice where authorities ensured the removal of corrupt officials who had 
committed offenses against the state’s subjects, there are also a number of events in the 
history of Ottoman sultans that call this rhetoric of justice into question. It is argued that 
even though the sultan served as the legislator and promulgator of the law, he was not 
confined by the law and was himself above it.249 Thus, it is interesting to see how the 
sultan dealt with challenges that threatened his authority, which could also serve as a way 
to demonstrate the extent of power he exercised in maintaining his absolute rule. 
The challenges to the throne often emanated from within the imperial family, the 
administrative officials, and even from the provinces. However, it was from within the 
dynasty that the sultan felt most threatened.250 Thus, to limit the extent of the dynastic 
threats to the sultan’s rule, there were two clear-cut laws that regulated the succession to 
the throne; the ineligibility of females to ascend the throne, and that rulership was 																																																								
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patrilineal, meaning that only the sultan’s sons were entitled to the throne. This patrilineal 
method of succession went into practice starting from 1450 and up to 1595.251 However, 
there were no laws regulating which son entertained the right of succession. This 
eventually led to civil wars breaking out and the onset of the practice of fratricide252 
between brothers over who was to succeed the father.253 There are numerous examples of 
fratricide committed within the Ottoman dynasty to eliminate any threats to their 
sovereignty. Sultan Mehmed I (1413-1421) believed to have said when criticized over 
executing his brothers that, “in sovereignty, Ottoman rulers have let experience be their 
guide and therefore do not accept partnership in rule.”254 This practice became a custom 
whereas Sultan Mehmed II also executed the only brother who survived as soon as he 
ascended the throne. Sultan Bayzeid II remained restless during his reign until the death 
of his brother Cem and his sons. However, eventually, it was his own son Sultan Selim I 
who overthrew him in 1512 after he eliminated any rivalry to the throne by killing his 
two brothers and one of his brothers’ sons.255 Sultan Suleyman I’s succession was a 
smoother one seeing as that he had no brothers. However, the predicament of whom of 
his sons was to succeed him started early on before Sultan Suleyman I’s death. The 
rivalry between his two sons, Selim and Bayzeid, eventually led to Bayzeid escaping to 
Iran, and with the support of Sultan Suleyman I himself, Selim II ascended the throne. In 
due course, after striking a treaty with the Safavid shah of Iran, executioners were sent by 
Sultan Suleyman to execute Prince Bayzeid.256 
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However, it was the last sultan of the 16th Century practice of fratricide that 
caused a public outrcry. After the death of Sultan Selim II in 1574, his only son Murad III 
succeeded him with no bloodshed, but later executed his four young brothers after he 
ascended the throne. It was his son and successor Sultan Mehmed III in 1595 who 
appallingly executed his nineteen infant brothers as soon as he became sultan.257 Imber 
maintains that, “it seems to have been public revulsion at the slaughter of princes [by 
Mehmed III] who put an end to the custom of fratricide and to have initiated the practice 
of secluding princes so that they could not present a danger to the reigning sultan.”258 
However, it was Sultan Mehmed II’s provision in his kanunname statute, which legalized 
the execution of male relatives on the basis that “most of the ulama have declared this 
lawful”259 and for the purpose of fending off any chance of civil war as well as carrying 
out such practice “for the sake of the order of the world.”260 It served to legitimize the 
practice of fratricide but did not seem to work well in appeasing the public during the 
reign of Mehmed III, thus putting an end to the practice.261 Yet, challenges to the throne 
did not only stem from brothers, but also from other members of the sultan’s family or 
even his executive officials. Sultan Suleyman I, for instance, executed his own son 
Mustafa in 1553 out of fear of being dethroned by him.262 Moreover, the execution of his 
grand Vizier Ibrahim Paşa also serves as an interesting example of the sultan’s absolute 
rule and the extent of his authority.263 
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Celâlzâde Mustafa, who served as nişancı (1534-1556) and who authored 
Tabakâtü'l-Memâlik ve Derecâtü'l-Mesâlik that contributed to the idealization of the 
reign of Sultan Suleyman I, best described how justice was perceived during his time.264 
He argued that justice rested on “the absolute rule of the sultan.”265 The sultan was 
regarded as the only one who possessed the capability of carrying the “heavy burden” of 
sovereignty. The leadership that he was endowed with by God enabled him to administer 
justice even in cases that could not be conclusively proven. 266 Yilmaz contends that, in 
accordance with Celâlzâde, “the sultan’s very existence serves the welfare of society due 
to the stability ensured by a powerful political authority.”267 It is this line of reasoning 
and this perception of justice that was utilized in the liquidation of threats that challenged 
the sultan’s absolute rule. 
One way that the sultans ensured the loyalty of their ministers was through 
marriage. Establishing foreign allegiances through marriage was abandoned in 1450 for 
the practice of marrying off Ottoman princesses to members of the sultan’s 
administration.268 This grew to become a tradition where the Ottoman sultan often 
married off his sister or his daughter to his grand Vizier so he would be bound to the 
dynasty in such a way that would eliminate any possibility of rebellion.269 However, this 
practice was proven not to be a real guarantee. Sultan Suleyman I’s grand Vizier Ibrahim 
Paşa (1523-1536) gained more eminence and power by marrying the sultan’s sister in 
1524.270 He was favored by Sultan Suleyman and was appointed as grand Vizier against 																																																								
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all odds seeing as that he had no history or knowledge in governance.271 The sultan had 
ignored appointing the candidate to the Vizierate Ahmed Paşa —contrary to the 
traditional practice—and sent him off to become governor of Egypt.272 Ibrahim Paşa was 
considered a very powerful Vizier who the sultan deemed as his “alter ego” in matters of 
administration.273 Celâlzâde described him as a virtuous person who held high integrity 
and who was keen to observe justice. However, Celâlzâde argued that the character of 
Ibrahim Paşa had changed immensely when he gained more power and prestige after 
leading the conquest of Tabriz in Iran.274 He began to listen to “dishonest and inferior 
people,” whom one of them had seduced him into using the title of sultan seeing as that 
he made a great ruler. Thus, Ibrahim Paşa took up the title of “serasker sultan.”275 
Accordingly, when Sultan Suleyman I heard of Ibrahim Paşa’s undertakings, he ordered 
his execution siyaseten in 1537.276 
Celâlzâde alleged that the execution of Ibrahim Paşa was in part due to the fact 
that the sultan was displeased with Ibrahim Paşa’s conquest of Tabriz. Moreover, he 
rested the justification of his execution on that the grand Vizier had become “a source of 
injustice” who disregarded the laws and traditions.277 However, it is safe to conclude that 
the actions of Ibrahim Paşa’s threatened the dynastic interests of Sultan Suleyman I and 
acted as a contender for his absolute authority. Another line of argument is that Sultan 
Suleyman’s wife Hürrem and daughter Mihrimah had driven the sultan to execute 																																																								
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Ibrahim Paşa and his sons from other women, Mustafa and Bayzeid by “[tampering] with 
[the sultan’s] sentiments.”278 It is interesting to note that Mihrimah’s husband, Rustem 
Paşa, had later become grand Vizier (1549-53; 1555-62).279 
Siyaset punishments were not restricted to the execution of the sultan’s sons or his 
officials only. Celâlzâde recalls in his Tabakât other incidents besides Ibrahim Paşa’s 
where the sultan ordered executions siyaseten; one such case, as Heyd puts it, is as 
follows: 
“In 1528 the house of a Muslim in Istanbul was attacked at night by 
unknown persons, all its inhabitants were killed and its contents were 
looted or destroyed. The perpetrators were not found, but suspicion, 
supported by certain ‘indications’, fell on a certain group of non-Muslim 
vagrants (levend) who in the past had been repeatedly suspected of, or 
charged with, similar crimes. Thereupon about eight hundred such people 
were rounded up in the markets, taverns, etc. and publicly executed 
siyaseten.”280 
 
What is more fascinating about this case is the justification Celâlzâde gave for such an 
incident. He argued, gruesome as it was and despite the innocence of most of the people 
executed, this incident prompted fear in the wrongdoers and deterred any such future 
actions from taking place.281 The sultan’s wide discretion of siyaset punishments—a 
principle that found its way into the kanun—to deal with injustices that threatened the 
public order and welfare of society was regarded as a necessity. Even if, it is argued, the 
sultan transcends the boundaries set forth by the shari’a, it is justified on the basis of 
order and stability.282 Upon reflecting on the case of the Istanbul executions, an Ottoman 																																																								
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scholar in the 17th Century contends that “the very existence of the realm…depends on 
the threat of the Sultan’s punishment (siyaset), and public order would break down if the 
people did not live ‘between fear and hope.’”283 Even when it came to executing his son 
Bayzeid, Sultan Suleyman I used the notion of law and order as a point of departure in 
carrying out the siyaset punishment seeing as that his son was “a rebel who caused 
bloodshed among innocent people,” and it was the sultan’s responsibility as a just ruler 
and protector of the people to get rid of anyone who threatened his subjects.284 
)ı Hümâyûn-Divan( DivanThe Imperial II.  
The Ottoman government’s most fundamental obligation was the administration of 
justice and the sultan’s duty was to ensure that it was being fairly dispensed. 285 Even 
though he represented the main judicial authority and aimed at retaining his image as a 
just ruler, the sultan did not always administer justice himself and extended his authority 
to other formal organs of the state and to his executive officials. 286 The imperial divan, 
under the presidency of the grand Vizier, was one such organ that served as a cabinet that 
was in charge of the governmental affairs and also acted as a high court that was 
responsible for administering justice. 287  In spite of exercising authority that was 
subservient to that of the sultan’s, the divan still represented the extent of the deepening 
of the bureaucratic organization and the centralization of the state.288 Moreover, being at 
the helm of the state’s administration and its enforcement of justice, the divan came to 																																																								
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designate an integral part of the legal administration of the Ottoman Empire in the early 
period. It is thus important to understand the setup of such a structural institution, how it 
developed over the early period of the Ottoman Empire, and how it also came to signify 
part of the core-periphery relations. 
The institution serving as a high court existed well before the Ottoman Empire 
with similar practices that were later implemented by the Ottoman authorities. Some of 
the purposes of previous divans were to establish justice, prosecute officials who 
transgressed the rights of the subjects, and to act as an appeal court for petitions and 
complaints submitted by the subjects.289 The pre-Ottoman divan bore different functions 
and structural forms that were in one way or another similar to that of the Ottomans’.290 
However, the Imperial divan, serving as a continuation of the system of previous 
institutions of divans, witnessed a series of developments and changes to its structure and 
functions over the 15th and 16th Centuries, which made it a lot more grounded in the 
bureaucratic makeup of the Ottoman state.291 
In the early Ottoman period, the divan functioned as an institution that dealt with 
less pivotal and administrative matters on behalf of the sultan.292 In spite of the fact that 
the kanun was in origin based on the will of the sultan, notable officials in the divan—the 
grand vizier or the nişancı—at times issued edicts on the authority of the sultan or offered 
suggestions to the sultan in regards to the enactment of certain decrees.293 Thus, the divan 
had maintained part of the process of legislation. Moreover, initially, besides acting as a 																																																								
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court where the state’s subjects could submit their complaints and lawsuits, the divan had 
also acted as the sultan’s advisory divan in matters regarding political or military 
decisions.294 Following the Seljuk tradition of presiding over the divan himself and 
dispensing justice,295 the sultan, as described by an Egyptian chronicler during the reign 
of Bayzeid I (1389-1402), “would sit early in the morning on a broad eminence with the 
people standing away from him at a distance where he could see them. If anyone had 
suffered an injustice, he would submit it to him, and he would remove it.”296 Despite the 
informality of the sultan’s administration of justice, there was a lot of emphasis that was 
placed in the early 15th century on the importance of the sultan appearing in public before 
his people and presiding over the divan himself. An interesting story that depicts the 
importance of such an event as retold by Imber, reads as follows: 
“When [Mehmed I (1413-21)] died, the [Viziers] sought to conceal the fact 
until the arrival of his elder son, Murad, to take the throne. They continued 
to hold a divan every day at the Sultan’s ‘Gate’—presumably in the Palace 
at Edirne—‘giving out governorships and fiefs and seeing to affairs.’ 
However, when a group of soldiers threatened rebellion because they had 
not seen the sultan, the [Viziers] brought the corpse to the gate, with a lad 
behind to move its arms, so that it would appear as if the sultan were alive 
and stroking his beard.” 
 
Pal Fodor holds that the two separate functions of the sultan administering justice and the 
grand Vizier and other members acting as an informal advisory divan for decision-making 
were retained by two separate organs.297 The first witnessed the informal process of the 
sultan dispensing justice out in the open in the 14th and early 15th Century, while the 
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second “attended to political and governmental issues, giving counsel and making 
arrangements for the sultan’s decisions.”298 However, with Murad II delegating the task 
of administering justice to the kadi-‘asker in the 15th Century,299 and Mehmed II later 
abandoning the tradition of presiding over the divan himself and delegating its presidency 
to the grand Vizier,300 a “Great Divan” had begun to develop into a formal organ of 
governance that acted on behalf of the sultan and that unified the different functions 
carried out by the sultan and members of the divan.301 However, even though the grand 
Vizier had assumed the role of the sultan in presiding over the divan, this did not 
necessarily entail that the sultan was unaware of what happened within the divan. First 
off, it was the grand Vizier’s duty to inform the sultan with all the discussions and 
deliberations that took place after the divan meetings were held.302 Secondly, the sultan 
had a “small square window” overlooking the divan chamber to listen to what took place 
during the sessions without being seen.303 Thus, the members of the divan were always 
aware of the possibility of the sultan listening in on the divan proceedings; hence, 
members could not conceal from the sultan whatever discussions unfolded.304 Some 
attribute the creation of the window to Mehmed II while others credit it to Suleyman I.305 
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Nonetheless, references show that the sultans continued to watch over the divan chamber 
through the window well into the 17th Century.306 
Structure and Membership of the Imperial Divan  
By the reign of Mehmed II, the main posts and functions of the members of the divan had 
already been established. The number of members had largely increased over the years; 
however, the functions of the most important members had remained intact. 307 
Membership of the divan consisted of the Viziers, the military judges (kadi-‘asker), the 
treasurers (defterdar), and the nişancı. Besides dealing with the military and political 
affairs of the divan, the Viziers also took part in the military campaigns under the 
authority of the sultan or another commander higher in rank. The kadi-’askers—who sat 
beside the Viziers and were permanent members of the divan—were the chief judges 
responsible for the judicial affairs of the divan. The defterdar was in charge of the 
financial department, while the nişancı was the affixer of the sultan’s tuğrâ and ensured 
the authentication of documents and decrees. The former two sat below the Viziers and 
kadi-‘askers.308 
Initially, there were three Viziers who were members of the divan in early 15th 
Century. This continued to be the case until the number increased to four in mid-16th 
Century, and to eleven by the 17th Century.309 However, it is difficult to tell who were the 
full-time members seeing as that during the 17th Century, Viziers were ordinarily 
dispatched to serve in the provinces.310 The creation of the position of kadi-‘asker dates 
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back to the time of Murad I. There had been a single kadi-‘asker until towards the end of 
Mehmed II’s reign when grand Vizier Mehmed Paşa of Karaman created the post of a 
second kadi-‘asker—who became the Kadi-‘asker of Rumelia—to counteract the 
authority of the other kadi-‘asker—who was promoted to the post of Kadi-‘asker of 
Anatolia.311 The number of defterdars had also increased over the years to four by the 
end of 16th Century. This is argued to be due to the fact that there were growing financial 
pressures merited by deficits in revenue because of inflation and unprofitable military 
conquests. Moreover, there are no references that indicate that there was more than one 
nişancı—a post which is believed to date back as early as the 15th Century.312 Those four 
senior posts came to represent the different domains of the empire: “the political, judicial, 
and financial.” 313  Those three realms represented the sultan’s administration. 
Furthermore, despite the earlier interchanges that took place between the different 
posts—where a kadi-‘asker could become Vizier or a nişancı a grand Vizier—this 
changed by the 16th Century where each post became exclusive with specified functions 
and careers.314 However, even though the posts had taken a more designated form by the 
16th Century, the division of tasks goes back to the kanunname of Mehmed II where it 
detailed the jurisdiction of authority of the four leading members of the divan.315 The 
degree of power that each member exercised did not necessarily entail the sovereignty of 
decisions. The grand Vizier, for instance, could not issue financial decisions without the 
knowledge of the defterdar. Thus, there had to be coordination in the decision-making 
process between members of the divan and opinions of executive members could not be 																																																								
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overlooked, not even by the grand Vizier himself. In all probability, this was meant to 
balance out the power between members in the divan.316 
Besides the four executive members, there were others who, by the 16th Century, 
also occasionally sat in the divan. Some of who were the commander-in-chief 
(beglerbégi) of Rumelia, the grand-admiral, and the ağa of the Janissaries. 317 
Additionally, there was an increase in the number of clerks by the 16th Century who 
served under each domain represented in the divan who were responsible for 
administrative work. By 1627-8, the number of clerks amounted to 115.318 Furthermore, 
it is noteworthy here that despite of the significant position he employed in the state’s 
administration, which became also significantly higher in rank than that of the kadi-
‘asker,319 the seyhulislam did not sit in the Imperial Divan.320 This was different from 
other previous divans in Muslim states and the Mamluk Dar al-‘Adl where there was a 
seat dedicated to the mufti.321 However, the seyhulislam was at times requested to appear 
before the divan for advice in regards to certain cases.322 In the renowned case of the 
heretic Molla Kabız in 1527—who had preached the superiority of Jesus over 
Muhammad and other controversial doctrines—the grand Vizier Ibrahim Paşa turned the 
case over to the kadi-‘askers of Rumelia and Anatolia.323 However, Celâlzâde Mustafa 
argued that given their lack of knowledge on matters regarding the shari’a, the kadi-
‘askers failed to refute the arguments of Kabız who had cited verses from the Koran and 																																																								
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hadith; thus, they “could find nothing to say save hakamtu bi-kathlihi [‘I sentence him to 
death’].”324 Seeing as that Ibrahim Paşa believed that the case required to be dealt with in 
accordance with the shari’a and not ‘urf as well as the inability of the kadi-‘askers to 
make sound religious counter arguments, the grand Vizier set Kabız free from the divan. 
However, Sultan Suleyman I, who had been listening to the case through the window 
overlooking the divan chamber, decided that there were other competent men in the 
religious fields and requested the presence of the seyhulislam Kemalpaşazade and the 
qadi of Istanbul Sa’di Çelebi to reexamine the case before the divan.325 In the course of 
the retrial, the seyhulislam refuted Kabız’s heretical arguments intelligibly and asked him 
if he wished to renounce them. When he rejected, the seyhulislam turned the case over to 
the qadi to give his sentence, who in turn again asked Kabız to renounce his beliefs. 
When he refused once more, he was sentenced to death.326 
Seeing the importance and weight given to the opinion and legal advice of 
seyhulislam, the question remains of why he did not have a seat in the divan. One 
argument holds that there was a growing need to create a religious figure who would act 
as a symbol of the shari’a and who would hold a character that was markedly distinct 
from the government’s secular character. 327  The imperial divan was seen as the 
embodiment of that secular government, and there was desire to protect the seyhulislam 
from the “taint of secularism.”328 Another argument maintains the inferiority of the office 
of seyhulislam in the 15th Century on the grounds that the kadi-‘asker’s salary exceeded 
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that of the seyhulislam’s. However, it is again argued that the “lowness” of his salary was 
also due to the desire to protect him from the “accusation of worldliness.”329 
The leading officeholder of the sultan’s administration was the grand Vizier. He 
was considered as the second in command after the sultan,330 and as mentioned earlier, 
his “alter ego.”331 In the kanunname of Mehmed II, the grand Vizier’s status was closely 
described as follows: “Know that the grand Vizier is, above all, the head of the Viziers 
and commanders. He is greater than all men; he is in all matters the sultan’s absolute 
deputy. The defterdar is deputy of the Treasury but under the supervision of the grand 
Vizier. In all meetings and in all ceremonies the grand Vizier takes his place before all 
others.”332 With this extent of power vested in him, some could argue that the grand 
Vizier ran the empire for the sultan. Bearing this kind of prestige and high rank, no other 
officeholder could question or restrict the authority of the grand Vizier.333 He was the 
sultan’s confidant who was contended to be the only one aware of the state of affairs and 
no one could interfere between him and the sultan in regards to their secret dealings and 
decisions.334 He reached a power height where he could take decisions and make 
appointments or dismissals without the sultan’s approval.335 Furthermore, serving as the 
“military commander and the sultan’s absolute deputy in civil administration” was 
something that was unprecedented in Muslim states and a novel form of authority that the 
grand Vizier began to exercise under the reign of Murad I.336 With such great power and 
authority entrusted to the grand Vizier, out of fear of rivalry, Mehmed II began the 																																																								
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traditional practice of appointing a grand Vizier who was an offspring of peasants and did 
not come from dynastic lineage as earlier grand Viziers did.337 Moreover, attending to the 
presidency of the divan, the grand Vizier had a multitude of functions. His chief 
responsibilities were to maintain social and political order, hear out petitions, and 
administer justice.338 He also exercised the right of supervision of all governmental 
departments and it had become the custom that decisions issued by the grand Vizier in the 
divan could not be turned down by the sultan.339 Almost all matters had to go through the 
grand Vizier first for confirmation, even orders passed by the sultan.340 Thus, in large, the 
grand Vizier came to constitute an important element in the policy-making process and 
administration of the Ottoman Empire. 
Despite exercising such a vast authority, the grand Vizier’s power was not 
unlimited. Even though he possessed the authority of taking decisions without consulting 
the sultan at times, the grand Vizier still had to consult with other members of the divan 
before issuing important rulings. One of the reasons for the execution of Ibrahim Paşa 
was that he ceased to consult other members. Moreover, there were a number of grand 
Viziers who were executed other than Ibrahim Paşa for threatening the absolute power of 
the sultan.341 The appointment of other members was at times meant to curb the powers 
of the grand Vizier. The nomination of the chief defterdar under the reign of Murad III 
was one such example. Furthermore, the leading officeholders of the financial and 
judicial departments of the government were appointed by the sultan and were the 
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absolute representatives of their own domains.342 With such division of functions in the 
state’s administration, the power of the grand Vizier could not have been absolutely 
unrestricted. Additionally, the apparatus of the divan was meant to promote the various 
opinions of its members, which also acted as a form of power check to balance out the 
degree of authority exercised by each member. 
Furthermore, according to Inalcik, “the ulema represented the greatest power 
within the state independent of the grand Vizier.”343 The appointment of qadis and other 
religious figures fell under the jurisdiction of the kadi-‘askers and not the grand Vizier. 
Moreover, the seyhulislam—despite not being a member of the divan—at times acted as 
the grand Vizier’s adversary. Exercising control over the judiciary and the appointments 
or dismissals of qadis in important provinces, the seyhulislam embodied a degree of 
authority that served to counteract that of the grand Vizier’s.344 An event that took place 
between Muhyiddin Çelebi 345 and Ibrahim Paşa—one of the most powerful grand 
Viziers—serves as an interesting example that showcases the degree of enmity that at 
times existed between the two. One day, when Muhyiddin Çelebi heard a case in the 
divan to give his opinion but chose to delay the judgment on the grounds of wanting to 
establish all the facts of the case, Ibrahim Paşa in turn argued that there was no reason for 
delay given his previous knowledge of the case as he “bore witness to it…and [believed] 
that the truth was clear.” To Ibrahim Paşa’s surprise, Muhyiddin Çelebi response was that 
the grand Vizier’s statement was inadmissible in accordance with the shari’a, seeing as 																																																								
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that Ibrahim Paşa was “an unmanumitted346 slave.”347 When Ibrahim Paşa complained to 
Suleyman I about how Muhyiddin Çelebi humiliated him, Suleyman responded that the 
seyhulislam was “a speaker of the truth, firm in the faith.” Thus, the sultan could not 
interfere with his judgments, but also that Ibrahim Paşa was indeed a freed slave. 
However, when Ibrahim Paşa went back to Muhyiddin Çelebi demanding that he 
considers his testimony as admissible, the seyhulsilam still did not take his word for it 
and demanded that the sultan confirmed it. Adding to the grand Vizier’s humiliation, the 
seyhulislam got hold of the document of manumission from the sultan that Ibrahim Paşa 
was indeed a freed slave and presented it to the grand Vizier before members of the divan, 
stating that he could now accept his testimony. This is a compelling example that 
showcases that despite the grandeur and prestige the grand Vizier possessed, his power 
was not absolute and could be threatened by other representatives of the sultan. 
Moreover, even though the grand Vizier was the “absolute deputy” and second man in 
command after the sultan, this did not necessarily mean that the sultan always sided with 
him. It also shows the strength of authority and status that the seyhulislam came to 
represent by the 16th Century. 
and the Institution of Petitioning DivanThe Functions of the Imperial  
Members of the divan, under the leadership of the grand Vizier, met four times a week to 
discuss military, administrative, political, and financial issues. 348  However, it is 
significant here to examine how the imperial divan functioned as the empire’s supreme 
court of justice. In the Seljuk and Mamluk traditions, complaints bearing an 																																																								
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administrative nature were handed over to members of the divan, while complaints that 
fell within the jurisdiction of the shari’a were dealt with in the qadi courts.349 Here, the 
Ottoman practice differs from previous practices. The grand Vizier exercised the 
authority of giving sentences in all matters in accordance to both the shari’a and the 
kanun.350 At times, the grand Vizier extended his authority to pass sentences to the two 
kadi-‘askers if the cases were too many.351  Moreover, the imperial divan dealt with the 
least to the most important cases. What differentiates the imperial divan as a court of 
justice from other shari’a courts is that specific cases could only be brought before the 
divan and not the qadi’s court. Only the divan could deal with cases that were politically 
sensitive352 or cases with claims that exceeded a stipulated amount of money.353 Qadis, 
members of the imperial learned hierarchy,354 foreigners,355 members of the military 
class,356 or members of the sultan’s administration could only be tried before the divan. 
Moreover, there were certain cases of non-Muslims that could not be dealt with by the 
qadi courts and had to appear before the divan. Such cases included the accusations 
brought against the Jews of ritual murders, heresy, apostasy of Muslims, and other cases 
that also included the Christian community.357  In the cases regarding non-Muslim 
foreigners, the treaty of Capitulations of 1535 between the Ottoman Empire and France 
dictated that a French consul or ambassador would be the one who tries French 																																																								
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subjects.358 However, if a foreign subject was tried before the divan, a diplomatic 
representative had to be present.359 
A principle that the Ottoman divan held in common with the earlier mazalim 
courts was that anyone could bring his case before the divan or submit his grievance in 
form of a petition, no matter how minor.360 The divan had thus begun to function as a 
mechanism of justice that served as a platform for public audience.361 Members of the 
divan often met to hear out the grievances of the people and rectify the injustices caused 
against them.362 The state’s subjects utilized this institution of petitioning to complain 
against the abuses committed by other individuals, executive officials, tax collectors, 
qadis, or governors.363 In theory, the petitions were addressed to the sultan. However, in 
reality, they were dealt with by the imperial divan as a whole on behalf of the sultan or by 
the grand Vizier in his place of residence.364 Petitions were submitted by either sending a 
courier to Istanbul or through a qadi who would draw up a letter of grievance to the 
sultan.365 In case the dispute was urgent, the qadi would send a spokesman to Istanbul. In 
some instances, the plaintiff or petitioner would submit the case himself before the 
divan.366 This system of appeal or petitioning was one of the vital functions of the 
imperial divan and there was a lot of emphasis that was placed on it.367 As mentioned 																																																								
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earlier, there was the idealized image of the sultan personally listening to his subjects’ 
grievances and publicly dispensing justice; however, over the centuries, the institution of 
petitioning grew more and more bureaucratized with a specific process of petitioning and 
a record-keeping system.368 By the 17th Century, there was an archival register—
Registers of Complaints (Şikayet Defterleri)—that was dedicated to recording copies of 
the divan’s responses to petitions and other imperial matters. It is argued that the 
emphasis on creating such a bureaucratic system for petitioning was a response to the 
growing number of petitions submitted to the divan over the years and the growing 
likelihood of the palace to be more attentive to the grievances of the public. However, 
what is mostly made available is the end process of responding to petitions, and not the 
course of action that was taken to produce a response. Some petitions survive in the 
Department of Complaints (Şikayet Kalemi), which was created in the 18th Century as a 
more improved record-keeping system of the divan’s responses to petitions and the 
further emphasis that was placed on their importance. 
Those bureaucratic reforms, serving as one of the main functions of the imperial 
divan, showcase a momentous aspect of the core-periphery relations: how the state, 
through undertaking such measures to create such a system, became more engaged in the 
social scene, as well as how the public began to view the government. It could be 
contended here that the subjects regarded petitioning the divan as a system that could 
yield results and have an impact in changing a given situation, no matter how trivial.369 
The question that remains here is why, given the increase in the number of shari’a courts 																																																								
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throughout the provinces of the Ottoman Empire, some chose to turn to petitioning the 
divan rather than appealing before the local qadi, even though “sending a petition to 
Istanbul would have involved significant investment of money and time.”370 Moreover, in 
some cases, the divan referred the case to the provincial qadi or governor.371 One angle 
that could be considered here is that in some cases the petition was an appeal against a 
sentence passed by a qadi. Peters contends that, despite the lack of an official system of 
appeal having existed in the Ottoman legal administration, there was still room for capital 
punishments to be reevaluated by the sultan or the divan if a petition is submitted before 
the sentence is administered.372 A firman is thus issued in case the appeal is accepted, 
delegating an investigator to review the case and request a retrial or pass a new sentence. 
The qadi’s or governor’s sentence could be revoked on the grounds that either the official 
accepted a bribe to inflict a certain sentence or the sentence was passed on the basis of a 
false testimony.373 In other cases, a lawsuit or a petition was sent to the same court for a 
retrial or to another court in the same district if the appeal made was against the local 
qadi.374 Another possible reason for why people chose to go through the trouble of 
petitioning the divan was that the divan’s response to the petition often gave specific 
instructions for the qadi to follow and had the ability to largely impact a trial before the 
local court.375 A third reason that James Baldwin advances here is that many petitioners 
aimed at collecting a large number of authoritative documents to strengthen their 
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position. Thus, they would obtain a fatwa, register their case in a shari’a court, acquire a 
decree issued by the divan, or secure an order by the local governor.376 
However, though anyone could bring his case before the divan, the fact that the 
process of petitioning required not only time and effort but also money meant that there 
was a degree of limited accessibility to the divan.377 Moreover, Inalcik argues that, 
“justice and security were greatest in the regions nearest the capital,”378 seeing as that the 
divan was more accessible to those who lived near Istanbul and did not take too long to 
reach it. However, it could be concluded here that the divan did indeed address the 
subjects’ grievances and aimed at removing injustices or abuses committed against them. 
This could to an extent reveal something about the legal system of administration, even if 
it at times fell short of justice. 
Those developments resulted in the imperial divan becoming more and more of a 
bureaucracy and a “decision making entity” that exercised administrative and legal 
authority on the sultan’s behalf.379 With the degree of authority and prestige vested in 
members of the divan, the sultan’s representatives appropriated political power and 
wealth. They answered only to the sultan and he alone could pronounce sentences against 
them in matters retaining to the public.380 A case in 1596 calling for the trial of the 
defterdar who was accused of accepting bribes was rejected on the premise that “the 
chief defterdar acts on the sultan’s authority and is director of the Treasury in the sultan’s 
name. To date there has never been an inquiry into this office.”381	  
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CHAPTER 3: THE JUDICIARY 	
As previous chapters have shown, there were some significant historical developments 
that unfolded after the Ottoman conquests in the 15th and 16th Centuries. Perhaps the most 
important of those developments were made in regards to the imperial learned hierarchy, 
which saw the rise of a judicial class that was distinctly different from those of other 
Muslim state structures. The Ottoman judiciary came to constitute an integral part in the 
bureaucratic structure of the state, with the mufti (jurisconsult) and the qadi (judge) as its 
centerpieces. The developments of the Ottoman legal system must be in part attributed to 
the role the muftis—particularly the seyhulislam—and the qadis played in the 
bureaucratization of the state’s administration. In theory, the importance of both those 
figures lied in their embodiment of religious practices and traditions.382 As one was 
responsible for the interpretation of Islamic law, and the other responsible for the 
application of it, the mufti’s and the qadi’s roles were idealized for their sacred 
functions.383 However, by the 16th Century their offices grew more politicized and came 
to represent some of the innovations of the Ottoman legal practices. It is thus interesting 
to see the developments of those offices and how the mufti and qadi served as a crucial 
linking point between the state and society and between the “transcendent and 
mundane.”384  	
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I. The Seyhulislam (The Mufti of Istanbul)  
This section deals with the role the office of the Mufti of Istanbul played in the evolution 
and development of the Ottoman judicial hierarchy. It is primarily concerned with how 
the position developed from relative ambiguity to becoming one of the most prestigious 
and powerful positions in the Ottoman legal administration by the 16th Century. With the 
rise of an imperial learned hierarchy serving as a backdrop to the transformation of the 
office of muftiship,385 it is first important to trace back how the institution of muftiship 
was viewed with relative independence and how it functioned in the classical legal terms 
in the pre-Ottoman period. Furthermore, it is also interesting to see the role the institution 
of the seyhulislam realized in widening the Islamic legal discourse and serving to 
reconcile the secular elements of the Ottoman legal practice with the shari’a legal theory. 
Before pondering on the transformations that the institution of muftiship endured 
from pre-Ottoman to post-Ottoman, it is essential to grasp the classical concept of a mufti 
and his fatwa (Fetva in Turkish), with issuing fatwas based on the shari’a as his chief 
function. With the necessary religious qualifications, a mufti exercised the authority to 
issue a fatwa within the scope of the shari’a as an answer to a question presented to 
him.386 Serving as the qadi’s counterpart in the Islamic legal system, the capacity that the 
mufti held was nonetheless fundamentally different from that of the qadi’s. There are a 
number of differences that could be highlighted here. Firstly, although fatwas are 
authoritative sources of law, they are however not binding legal statements; unlike a 
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qadi’s judgment that is both binding and irrevocable.387 Secondly, a qadi’s ruling is 
effective only in a given case, while a mufti’s fatwa becomes an authoritative statement of 
law that would still serve as valid for consultation in other cases.388 Thirdly, qadis 
primarily tackle disputes either between the subjects or between the subject and the state, 
while a mufti deals with a wider range of concerns that vary from obscure matters to 
questions regarding religious practices. 389  Fourthly, the qadi’s appointment was a 
prerogative of the sultan, whereas the mufti enjoyed a fair degree of independence in 
classical legal practice from the state authorities.390 Finally, a mufti, by virtue of his role 
in interpreting the Islamic legal doctrine and extending his interpretations to be 
administered in new cases, is considered a mujtahid (“a performer of independent legal 
discretion”), while a qadi is regarded as a muqallid.391 However, Burak argues that in the 
Hanafi legal doctrine, there was also a mufti who was considered a muqallid.392   
Highlighting those differences serves in articulating the capacity fulfilled by the 
mufti in the judicial system in relation to the qadi. Furthermore, placing the mufti within 
the right historical and legal context aids in understanding how he came to constitute part 
of the qadi’s court’s legal proceedings. Even though a mufti’s legal opinion is not a 
binding statement of law and is thus not enforceable, a qadi may seek legal advice from 
him in regards to a specific case to clarify a legal point and base his sentence on his 
fatwa.393 Moreover, litigants often consulted the fatwas of muftis and presented them 
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before the court to strengthen their position.394 Even though the qadi was not obligated to 
administer a fatwa—whereas it was neither required nor rejected by the court—it came to 
constitute an integral element in the court proceedings.395 According to Gerber’s study of 
thousands of Bursa court records from the 17th Century, all litigants who presented a 
fatwas in court won their cases.396 Gerber argues that the reason behind litigants with 
fatwas winning their cases is that muftis did not issue their fatwas without spending 
sufficient time deliberating a case at hand.397 Furthermore, hundreds of court records 
were found to have cited fatwas; however, the eminence of the fatwa in the adjudication 
process of the court came later under the Ottomans. Nonetheless, despite being renowned 
as an important source for judicial authority, a mufti did not exercise the same power or 
stature a qadi did. There was no hierarchy of muftis that existed the same way it had for 
the qadis and muftis did not hold any official status.398 They were appealed to for their 
religious knowledge and not for being enforcers of the law.399 However, by the 15th 
Century, with the emergence of an imperial learned hierarchy came the unprecedented 
institutionalization of the muftiship and the rise of the office of seyhulislam. To fully 
grasp the extent of this transformation, a brief comparison will be made to the institution 
of muftiship during the later period of the Mamluk’s reign.    
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Muftiship: From Mamluk to Ottoman and the Evolution of the Seyhulislm  
Burak gives an interesting account of the institution of muftiship in the late Mamluk 
sultanate and examines the “intense encounter” between the ideals and understandings of 
the pre-Ottoman institution and between the new perceptions and the reconstructed form 
of this institution under the Ottomans.400 A reading of this transformative juncture serves 
as a compelling point of departure for this section wherein it crystalizes the degree of the 
accomplishments in the state’s bureaucracy the Ottomans had reached by the 16th 
Century. As previously mentioned, qadis were appointed by the sultan whereas muftis 
were not; they exercised the issuance of fatwas independently of the state’s authority. 
This was true to the reign of the Mamluks.401 How then did muftis gain their credibility of 
being commanding sources of judicial authority? It was the prevailing tradition during the 
Mamluk period and even earlier for jurists and scholars to travel in the quest for 
knowledge to learning centers inside and outside the bounds of the Mamluk sultanate. A 
jurist was then often granted a permit by his teacher, which made him a mufti and allowed 
him to teach law and issue fatwas.402 Granting a permit became an important element in 
the institutionalization of the mufti, which was conferred on the student at some point 
during his training career. Gaining the certificate to teach and issue fatwas was necessary 
for holding offices, such as becoming a judge or a professor at a madrasa.403 Anyone who 
was granted a permit held the prerogative of issuing a fatwa, whether or not they 
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occupied a teaching or judicial position. However, only jurists and scholars were entitled 
to this permit.404   
 Muftis did not hold an administrative position during the Mamluks, but qadis did. 
However, what is interesting here that becomes later fundamentally different from 
Ottoman legal practices is that the differences between a mufti and a judge were not very 
clear-cut. A state appointed judge or deputy judge—having been granted a permit—also 
exercised the authority of issuing a fatwa. Yet, qadis held official administrative offices 
while muftis did not.405 Nonetheless, only the mufti of the Mamluk Dar al’Adl held an 
official position; even so, his functions were limited to that of a regular mufti with his 
fatwas neither being enforceable nor holding the power to revoke a qadi’s sentence.406 
Seeing as that holding a permit supplied any jurist or scholar with the authority of issuing 
fatwas, not all of the muftis necessarily held the sufficient or proper knowledge to do so. 
In order to curtail some of the fluidity that existed in the institution of muftiship, the 
Mamlulk Sultan al-Zahir Barquq by the end of the 14th Century issued an edict restricting 
the muftis to abide by their schools of law and declared that it was the duty of the chief 
qadis of each school to grant permits to the muftis to issue fatwas in accordance to their 
respective schools.407 This depicts that there were some early attempts to standardize the 
issuance of fatwas and to a degree limit the number of individuals who could issue them. 
It also shows that the “multiplicity” of muftis must have been a predicament to some 
extent.408 However, Burak argues that despite the attempts made by the Mamluk sultan, 
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the supervision of muftis still fell under the jurisdiction of the jurists and it was not an 
administrative matter to deal with.409  
 Despite not having a hierarchy that paralleled that of the qadis’ there was an 
unofficial hierarchy that began to appear, which saw the rise in prominence of certain 
muftis over others. Yet, there was still not a coherent institution or a standardized system 
that regulated the muftis. This is again shown in the problem the multiplicity of 
jurisconsults occasioned in regards to the different opinions that existed amongst muftis 
of different schools or within the same school. There were no guiding principles or a 
hierarchal authority to turn to in order to settle the “constant dispute and strife” amongst 
muftis.410 This lack of homogeneity and uniformity may have served as a prelude to the 
“intense encounter” mentioned earlier between the Mamluk model of muftiship and the 
Ottoman model. Even though some of the Mamluk jurisconsult practices did indeed 
prevail well after the Ottoman conquests of Cairo and Damascus in the 16th Century, 
there was a significant change that took place in the provinces.411 The granting of 
permits, despite not being eradicated completely after the conquests, had decreased 
dramatically and no longer retained its previous value. Burak affiliates part of this decline 
with muftis being granted official appointments in Damascus under the Ottomans.412  
 By the mid-15th Century, the institution of muftiship began to witness 
fundamental changes to its structure under the Ottoman rule. With the rise of the imperial 
learned hierarchy and the Ottoman authorities’ regulation of the Hanafi doctrine, as well 
as the creation of a specific form of Ottoman “Hanafism,” the office of the seyhulislam 
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transpired by the 16th Century to become the head of the entire judicial institution.413 The 
emergence of this office prompted a series of significant political and administrative 
changes that succeeded in the integration of the religious hierarchy into the bureaucratic 
structure of the state.414 Seeing as that the rise of the Ottoman seyhulislam is reckoned to 
be one of the most foundational developments and innovations of the 16th Century 
Ottoman administration, the focus here will be primarily on examining the nature of the 
relationship that developed between the seyhulislam and the state—or the sultan for that 
matter—and how the seyhulislam grew more and more politicized. However, before 
proceeding with appreciating the dynamic reconfiguration of this office and how it came 
to be perceived, it is important to first grasp the shift from the Mamluk model to the 
Ottoman model to understand more clearly the changes that were brought about in the 
office of muftiship.  
 The hierarchy of muftis was made up of the seyhulislam—the Mufti of Istanbul—
and below him in rank were the provincial muftis. One of the reasons they were 
considered to be lower in rank is that the state-appointed provincial muftis, unlike the 
seyhulislam, were obliged to cite the authoritative texts they turned to in their fatwas by 
order of the sultan.415 Moreover, one way of introducing change to the institution of 
muftiship was appointing official muftis to the provinces. The motivation behind those 
appointments was in part to extend the accessibility to subjects of muftis with 
authoritative opinions.416 Prior to the designation of provincial muftis, the subjects had to 																																																								
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either send their inquiries to the mufti in Istanbul or to travel to the capital themselves.417  
Furthermore, one of the chief functions of appointing muftis to the provinces was to 
oversee the activities of officials and judges and to ensure that there was no oppression 
taking place as well as that they were abiding by the shari’a regulations.418 In regards to 
the appointment deed itself, the state authorities appointed muftis “from among the 
professors or from among the pious who were capable of issuing legal opinions.”419 
There was an association between the rise of the imperial madrasa system and the 
appointment of provincial muftis. It was often the case that teachers in important 
madrasas established by the sultans were appointed as provincial muftis. There was also a 
correlation between appointing muftis from the more important madrasas to holding the 
office in major cities. According to Burak, “the attachment of the office of the mufti to a 
prominent provincial madrasa characterizes mostly large urban centers.”420 That created a 
form of hierarchy that existed amongst muftis in the provinces; their salaries were one 
indication of the emergence of this hierarchy where salaries ranged from 40 akçes to 100 
akçes a day.421 Another aspect of this correlation was the fact that this could have been 
one attempt to “Ottomanize” the institution of the muftiship through reinforcing the 
position of the Hanafi mufti seeing as that, “the joint post [of mufti and teacher] passed at 
least temporarily from the hands of local scholars into those of Ottoman scholars.”422 
Even though the position of muftis constituted an official post in the Ottoman 
administration, their hierarchy and career and training tracks were not fully developed 																																																								
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like that of the qadis’ or muderris’,423 the appointments by the central government of 
provincial muftis created a distinction and a division of functions between judges and 
muftis, which also curtailed the “fluididity” that existed in the pre-ottoman institution of 
muftiship where almost anyone with a permit could issue fatwas. Moreover, perhaps this 
was one of creating a standardized judicial authority that limited who the subjects could 
turn to for legal opinions and also the “form” of rulings dispensed, as well as tying the 
provincial subjects more and more to the capital in a more cohesive manner. 
 Despite the emphasis Repp places on what he calls “the second class of mufti,”—
which follows the class of seyhulislam—there is a much richer literature that exists on the 
office of seyhulislam in contrast to that of the provinces.424 The emergence of the office 
of seyhulislam in the mid-15th Century did not see the instant crystallization of the office 
as it had in the 16th Century. One motive for the early appointment of seyhulislam lied in 
the growing need to create an image of religiosity of the state and to establish it within 
the “Islamic realm.” Another was, according to Michael M. Pixley, to subvert the power 
of the sultan’s opponents. 425  As mentioned in the previous chapter, the office of 
seyhulislam was one way to counter the government’s secular character by placing a 
symbolic religious figure. It is argued that the seyhulislam retained the same “symbolic” 
image as that of the Abbasid Caliphs in Mamluk Cairo. However, the capacity that the 
seyhulislam grew to fulfill shows that the office was fundamentally different from that of 
the Caliph’s. He represented an institution that later became highly involved in state 
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affairs.426 Moreover, according to the kanunname of Mehmed II which marked a major 
development in the office of seyhulislam, the functions of the office were described along 
with the status that the seyhulislam was to retain—which placed the position of the 
seyhulislam on the same grade as that of the grand vezir’s and entailed that the office was 
to hold even more respect. 427  
Seeing as that the seyhulislam was meant to employ a religious status in the 
Ottoman government away from “worldly” things, he in theory was not meant to receive 
a salary.428 However, the first seyhulislam was said to have received a salary of 30 akce 
per day while the kadi-‘asker received 500 akce daily. This, Pixley argues, “underscores 
the low profile of the seyhulislam” in the early 15th Century.429 However, the nature of 
the office of seyhulislam drastically changed from the 15th to the 16th Century in terms of 
perceptions: how they and other viewed them. Repp puts forward an interesting theory in 
this regard. He contends that in the 15th Century, when the office was still not fully 
developed, a scholar was more concerned with attaining “excellence in ‘ilm,” whereas by 
the 17th Century, a scholar’s success was linked to the status of his rank and salary.430 To 
what extent this was true could be contested; however, it is safe to say that by the 16th 
Century the office of the seyhulislam shifted towards a more “politicized nature” and held 
more prerogatives that entitled them to more authority.  
Some of the functions that became attached to the office by the 16th Century 
involved tending to the state’s administrative needs. The seyhulislam was incorporated in 																																																								
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the decisions made in regards to the conduct of government and public policy.431 This 
was born out of the relationship that flourished between the seyhulislam and the sultan. 
Before making important decisions, the sultan often consulted the seyhulislam and the 
grand vezir—heads of the religious and administrative authorities.432 The sultan also 
frequently turned to the seyhulislam if he wished to alter something in legal policy.433 By 
the 16th Century, the fatwa of the chief mufti was one aspect of this relationship. Pixley 
distinguishes between two types of fatwas: those involved in administrative affairs and 
those that are concerned with the public.434 The strength of the seyhulislam’s fatwa 
played an important role in undermining the authority of the qadi. When it came to the 
issue of differences of opinions amongst jurists, Ebu’s-su’ud’s suggestion to the sultan 
was, “to ensure that the individual [qadi] is…not permitted freely to choose whose 
opinion he will follow, but obliges to adjudicate in accordance with the sultan’s 
directives.”435 Those sultanic decrees were often promulgated on the initiative of the 
seyhulislam. If he wished to alter a point of law, the seyhulislam petitioned the sultan to 
issue a decree that would be binding on the qadis to enforce in their courts.436 This shows 
to what extent the seyhulislam’s office grew more attached to the sultan and, despite not 
being enforcers of the law, could affect what and how Islamic law was applied in the 
qadi’s court.  	 The nature of this relationship developed by the early 16th Century when Ali 
Cemali was seyhulislam. His period in office witnessed the three reigns of Bayzeid II, 																																																								
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Selim I, and Suleyman I.437 It was his encounters with Selim I that are worth noting here. 
When Ali Cemali heard that Selim I had ordered the execution of 150 treasury officials 
without clear evidence that establishes their offence, he went uninvited to the council to 
meet the sultan and told him that, “The duty of the [seyhulislam] is to watch over the 
after-life of the sultan. I have heard that you have ordered the executing of 150 men, the 
execution of whom is not lawful under the shari’a. You must pardon them.”438 Enraged, 
the sultan answered that it was not Ali Cemali’s position to interfere with the state affairs. 
However persistent, Ali Cemali insisted that he was interfering with the after-life of the 
sultan who will suffer greatly if he does not pardon them. Eventually, the sultan agreed to 
pardon them.439 In another case, Ali Cemali saved again another 400 silk merchants from 
execution by order of Selim I, once again under the rationalization of saving the sultan 
from the punishment of the after-life. When he calmed down, Selim I ordered the 
appointment of the two posts of the kadi-‘askers; however, Ali Cemali refused on the 
basis that, “he had sworn an oath to God never to let the word hakamtu pass his lips.”440 
Those two stories showcase the seyhulislam’s growing influence over the sultan. Even 
though the early 16th Century the institution of the seyhulislam had not yet witnessed its 
peak of development, there were more responsibilities being attached to it.  
As mentioned earlier, with the seyhulsilam being more involved with the sultan, 
the latter began to incorporate the former in matters of public policy. The seyhulislam 
was used as a tool to legalize certain actions by the state affecting its internal and external 
affairs. For instance, before launching the military campaigns against the Mamluks, 
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Selim I “put three questions to Ali Cemali who, in his answers to them, gave a legal basis 
for the projected campaign;” 441 thus, providing the sultan with sufficient religious 
grounds to proceed with the conquests. This was not the only case where certain 
administrative actions were based on the opinions of the religious scholars or the 
seyhulislam in particular for justifications. Suleyman I’s campaign against the safavids 
was said to have been advocated by Kemalpaşazade442—one of the renowned 16th 
Century seyhulislams. Another example that serves this point is when the fatwa of Ebu’s-
su’ud was sought out by the sultan to justify breaking the treaty with Venice in which the 
Ottomans seized Cyprus, despite the lack of consent amongst most vezirs.443  
The office of seyhulislam reached its height with Ebu’s-su’ud (1543-1574)444—
the most celebrated and distinguished seyhulislam in Ottoman history. A fitting 
description that serves as the prologue of Ebu’s-su’ud’s time as seyhulislam is cited in 
Imber: “the office of Mufti was troubled and passing from hand to hand. The roof of its 
house was unsupported, until its destiny was delivered to [Ebu’s-su’ud] and its keys 
handed over [to him].”445 There was a total of seven seyhulislams in the 16th Century 
starting with Ali Cemali and up to Ebu’s-su’ud.446 After the death of Kemalpaşazade who 
held office for 11 years, there were four other chief muftis before Ebu’s-su’ud. The four 
of them held office for a short period (the first held it for 5 years, the second held it for 4 
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years until his dismissal, the third for 1 year, and the fourth for 2 years).447 This was an 
indication that the office before Ebu’s-su’ud underwent a troubled phase and was to a 
degree weakened by the turnover. One aspect of this was that in theory, the chief muftis 
held tenure and were not prone to dismissals. However, the 16th Century witnessed the 
first dismissal of the seyhulislam—some were even executed later in the 17th Century.448  
With the emergence of Ebu’s-su’ud as seyhulislam, the office gained a lot of 
prerogatives, power, and prestige. There are a number of main developments in the office 
that are associated with Ebu’s-su’ud that elucidate to what extent it had changed and are 
of relevance here. The most nominal of which are his many attempts to reconcile the 
shari’a with the kanun and his involvement in policy making (this is further discussed in 
the next subsection). When it comes to decision-making, Ebu’s-su’ud grew more drawn 
to the political realm of the state more than the religious. He is most known for his efforts 
in extending the doctrine of the shari’a to fit the innovations introduced by the Ottoman 
authorities in several aspects of the state’s administration.449 The famous Maruzat of 
Ebu’s-su’ud—the ‘Matters’ submitted by him to Suleyman I—offer an important link 
between the seyhulislam and the sultan. It showcases the extent of Ebu’s-su’ud’s 
intervention in administrative matters of the state wherein he would issue a fatwa 
regarding a legal problem and petitions the sultan to endorse it, who in turn does so and 
decrees a firman that is thus sent out to qadis and governors to enforce it.450 Furthermore, 
what is noteworthy about the Maruzat fatwa collections is that it cites a lot of the kanun 
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decrees of Suleyman I,451 which shows to the willingness of the seyhulislam to issue 
opinions outside of the scope of the shari’a. He was no longer confined by the bounds of 
the shari’a doctrine, but became highly involved in the kanun as well. Some of the 
chapters in fatwa collections cover issues such as land or criminal laws that are not dealt 
with in the shari’a.452 Seeing as that the mufti was regarded as a mujtahid, Ebu’s-su’ud 
utilized “legal fictions” to find grounds in the shari’a for kanun innovations. 453 
According to Heyd, the seyhulislam and other muftis became more “authorized” and 
inclined to issue fatwas in accordance to both the shari’a and kanun.454 If the seyhulislam 
is asked a question in regards to an issue not dealt with in the shari’a, he issued a fatwa 
based on kanun.455 One reason for this degree of acceptance of Ebu’s-su’ud towards the 
kanun regulations is that prior to being seyhulislam he had served as qadi and kadi-‘asker 
of Rumelia where he “followed” the kanun for a lengthy period of time so it was not 
apprehensible for him to deem kanun as illegal now that he became seyhulislam.456 
Another possible reason that Ebu’s-su’ud had established in one of his rulings is that, 
“there can no decree of the Sultan ordering something that is illegal according to the 
shari’a.”457 Thus, the kanun could not have simply contradicted the shari’a. To what 
extent or it did not is the centerpoint of a lot of debate.  
However, regardless here of the debate, Ebu’s-su’ud must be credited for his 
efforts to systematize the law. There are a number of innovations that were introduced 
and legalized by Ebu’s-su’ud that could be briefly mentioned here other than the ones 																																																								
451 Heyd, Studies in old Ottoman Criminal Law, p. 184. 
452 Ibid., 190. 
453 Ibid., 188. 
454 Ibid., 189. 
455 Ibid.,188. 
456 Ibid. 
457 Ibid., 192. 
96		
that will be expanded on below: legalization of fines, the statute of limitations, and the 
liability of blood-money. As previously mentioned in the chapter on Ottoman law-
making, the kanun prescribed fines to a number of offences, which was a penalty that is 
outside of the scope of the shari’a. This dates back to the kanunname of Mehmed II; 
however, it is of importance here that Ebu’s-su’ud legitimized the “fiscal” character of 
this penalty and even prescribed it in some of his fatwas. When asked if it was authorized 
for a judge or governor to impose a monetary fine, Ebu’s-su’ud’s response was: “I have 
heard from a reliable person that a money fine is permissible if the judge or governor sees 
fit. A case in point is when a man does not attend Friday prayer. It is permissible to 
punish him with a fine.”458 Moreover, the statute of limitation serves as another case 
wherein the sultan issued a decree on the initiative of a fatwa of Ebu’s-su’ud. The 
sultanic decree enacted in 1550, fixed “an obligatory statute of limitation of ten years in 
all matters other than those pertaining to sown lands, in which the limit for filing suits 
was set at fifteen years.”459 This was, once again a change introduced on the basis of 
Ebu’s-su’ud’s ijtiahd wherein jurists before him have pondered over the matter for years 
and it had remained unresolved. In regards to the liability of blood-money, which was 
briefly discussed in the chapter on Ottoman law-making, the decree issued holding the 
occupant of a residence where a murder took place liable for blood-money was also based 
on the initiative of Ebu’s-su’ud. Here, the seyhulislam requested that the sultan should 
adopt the opinion of Abu Yusuf over that of Abu Hanifa’s who was of the opinion that 
the owner and not the occupant should be held liable.460 Those cases serve to demonstrate 
the nature of the relationship between the seyhulislam and the sultan and to what extent 																																																								
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the workings of both the former and the latter led to legitimized efforts to expand the 
legal doctrine to encompass Ottoman innovations.  
Other forms of developments that were witnessed in the institutionalization of the 
office of seyhulislam during Ebu’s-su’ud were the growth in his salary, the authority he 
gained in making judicial appointments, 461  and lastly, his contributions to the 
bureaucratization of the institution of fatwa.462 As once stated, as a religious rather than a 
secular image, the seyhulislam was in theory not meant to receive a salary; however, Ali 
Cemali did receive a daily wage of 30 akçes, which was markedly less than that of the 
wage the kadi-‘asker had received then. However, when Ebu’s-su’ud assumed office, his 
daily wage rose to 600 akçes after the additions Suleyman I made to his salary.463 
Furthermore, besides the rise in his salary, Ebu’s-su’ud also gained the authority of 
becoming involved in the appointments of the imperial learned hierarchy.464 This was 
previously a prerogative of the kadi-‘askers with the grand vezir or the sultan either 
confirming or rejecting them.465 Pixley offers two explanations for this shift in the 
authority of judicial nominations; the first being that the grand vezir became preoccupied 
with more pressing matters than to go over the nominations, while the second is that this 
was an attempt to curb the power of the kadi-‘askers.466 Either way, those developments 
led to the seyhulislam assuming more power and prestige. 
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The last development deserves some attention here.467 The degree of evolution 
that the office of seyhulislam witnessed during Ebu’s-su’ud is again discerned in the 
contributions that he made to the institution of the fatwa. According to Pierce, “the 
influence of his position was reflected in the exponential increase in the number of fatwas 
he issued and in the parallel elaboration of a fatwa office.”468 His predecessor, Ali 
Cemali, also known as “the basket man,” used to have a small basket that he hung from 
his window where people used to put their questions on a piece of paper. He would then 
pull it back up when a petitioner pulled at the string, wrote down the answer on the same 
piece of paper and sent the basket back down.469 Earlier in the 16th Century, the fatwas 
were issued and delivered personally by the seyhulislam. Nonetheless, when Ebu’s-su’ud 
assumed office under the reign of Suleyman, the seyhulislam’s role grew to encompass 
more tasks and could no longer adequately meet the requirements of the increasing 
number of fatwas.  
The average number of fatwas issued twice a week ranged from 300 to 400 
fatwas. However, Ebu’s-su’ud is known to have issued 1412 fatwas in one day and on 
another he had issued 1413 fatwas. This is not to be merely attributed to the seyhulislam’s 
degree of efficacy but rather to the growing bureaucratized nature of his office by mid-
16th Century.  The previous informal system of the issuance of fatwas that had existed 
before Ebu’s-su’ud limited the number of fatwas that could be issued per day. However, 
the new setup of a department dealing specifically with the issuance of fatwa introduced 
by Ebu’s-su’ud greatly bureaucratized the procedure in which fatwas were dispensed. 
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The institution began to heavily depend on highly trained clerks who would write a 
petitioner’s question in the right format, which was again reexamined before being 
submitted to the seyhulislam. He would then write and sign his response and hand it to 
another clerk who would it pass it on to the questioner. The system involved even more 
clerks in the entire process from the question being first submitted to the response being 
handed out. This creation of the division of labor made for a highly efficient system of 
issuing fatwas that could meet the demands of the increasing numbers of questions 
coming in to the office of seyhulislam. Most times, the question was formulated in such a 
way that made the answer very clear wherein the seyhulislam answered simply with a yes 
or no.470 However, the only times where the seyhulislam wrote the question and answer 
himself when it was in response to a question posed by either the sultan or a high 
government officials, 471  or when there was too much pressure of work. 472  The 
developments and innovations introduced to the fatwa institution are one aspect that 
showcase to what extent the office of seyhulislam had become highly bureaucratized and 
involved in the state structure.473 It also depicts the emphasis placed on the fatwa and the 
strength that was attributed to it by the 16th Century. The fall of some sultans and grand 
vezirs came about on the basis of a fatwa. Sultan Ibrahim (1640-48) was deposed and 
executed on the strength of a fatwa.474 The fatwa came to resemble a legal power that 
justified actions that were controversial in nature. 	
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Ebu’s-su’ud’s Attempts to Reconcile the Kanun with the Shari’a: The Cash Waqf 
Controversy and the Mu’amalat  
Kemalpaşazade and Ebu’s-su’ud were known for their efforts to reconcile the kanun with 
the shari’a. However, Ebu’s-su’ud attempts at reconciliation were unparalleled. He is 
known for his many endeavors to bring Ottoman legal innovations into the workings of 
the shari’a. Jurists were often confronted with certain traditional practices that violated 
the Islamic doctrine. The response was to develop methodical opinions to create more 
coherent justifications for the unlawful practices.475 This is exactly what Ebu’s-su’ud did 
in regards to the issue of cash waqf to rest the controversy that stemmed from it. 
  Jon E. Mandaville put forward an interesting study that details the dynamics of 
the cash waqf controversy that unfolded in the 16th Century. The practice of cash waqf 
(waqf al-nuqud) meant, as Mandaville puts it, “The establishment of a trust with money 
the interest from which might pay the salary of a teacher, or a preacher, or even 
unashamedly pass into the pocket of the founder of the trust.”476 By the 15th Century, the 
practice of cash endowments was authorized in Ottoman courts despite jurists having 
condemned such practices that were unprecedented in the Islamic world.477 The rationale 
that served to legalize the institution of cash waqf followed that it was the common 
practice in most of Anatolia and Rumeli. The earliest example saw the charging of a 10% 
annual interest from the lent cash in 1423. The number of cash awqaf in relation to land 
awqaf between the reign of Mehmed II and Murad II was relatively low. The argument 
was that so long as cash waqf took up a small percentage of the awqaf as a whole, there 																																																								
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was no real problem. However, cash waqf became the prevailing form of endowment by 
the 16th Century and the debate ensued among the jurists “long after there was any chance 
for a reversal of the practice.”478  
The whole debate was centered around the fact that waqf was meant to be a 
permanent form of endowment that did not diminish and had a perpetual character. 
However, Abu Yusuf and Muhammad al-Shaybani accepted the endowment of certain 
moveables but not cash.479 Their permissibility was again established on the basis that 
this was the accepted practice (ta’amul) of the time. This concept of ta’amul was to be 
utilized and extended by the Ottomans in their reinforcement of the legal practice of cash 
waqf. The works of Ottoman scholars in support of the cash endowments in 15th Century 
cite the opinions of Abu Yusuf and al-Shaybani in regards to the legality of moveables. 
However, they explicitly kept out the fact that they did not approve of cash awqaf. This 
was a practice that had become embedded in the Ottoman legal procedures and was 
signed and accepted by the seyhulislams and kadi-‘askers. It was unquestioned until in 
the 1540s the kadi-‘asker of Rumeli, Çivizade,480 ruled that he disagreed with the cash 
waqf practice. The debate erupted between the Islamic legal theory and the Ottoman legal 
practice and was to continue on to the next century. This is when the efforts of Ebu’s-
su’ud at reconciliation were most notable. He responded to the opinion issued by 
Çivizade with a fatwa legalizing the practice of cash waqf on the basis that it is “popular 
and generally practice,” and that judges and governors have for long validated it. Thus, 
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“the practice was perfectly sound and irrevocable.”481 In one of his fatwas found in his 
Maruzat, Ebu’s-su’ud’s ruling is seen as follows:482  
Q: Explain according to what mezheb is the cash waqf judged to be legal 
and irrevocable. Must the judgment be, first, that it is valid (sihhatina) and 
second, that it is irrevocable (lazim)? 
A: Judges are now authorized to rule thus. 
 
Seeing as that Ebu’s-su’ud’s fatwa, despite being an authoritative source of law, is non-
binding, it had to be supported by the strength of a sultanic decree. Thus, to end ikhtilaf 
al-fuqaha’ over the controversy of cash waqf—and once again based on the initiative of 
the seyhulislam—Suleyman I issued a sultanic decree in 1548 formally legalizing the 
practice.483 Additionally, Ebu’s-su’ud wrote a 28-page essay serving as legal grounds for 
cash waqf.484 It is important to note here that this was the common practice in the central 
provinces of the empire and was not practiced in the Arab provinces.485   
 Interest on loans—which was also connected to the practice of cash 
waqf486—was another problematic issue that became rather prevalent by the 16th Century. 
It served as yet another bone of contention between the shari’a legal doctrine and the 
Ottoman legal practice of kanun. In the Ottoman Criminal Code of Suleyman I, Article 
number 103 states that, “persons who make [loan] transactions in accordance with the 
shari’a shall not be allowed [to take] more than eleven for [every] ten [pieces of money 
lent].” 487  Accordingly, any rate that would exceed the 10% interest—which was 
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supposedly meant to be in compliance with the shari’a—would be considered illegal.488 
Even though this was another sultanic decree based on the initiative of Ebu’s-su’ud, the 
interest rates on loans during his term fluctuated between 5%-30%.489 In the shari’a 
courts of Anatolia in the 17th Century, interests at 20% were the common accepted 
practice that was approved by both the judiciary and the sultan.490 However, attempts 
were made to introduce the concept of riba in a more subtle expression so as to not be in 
clear violation with the shari’a. Euphemisms such as ribh and mu’amala were often used 
instead.491  
  Ebu’s-su’ud issued fatwas legalizing kanun provisions on interest on loans. The 
problem that Ebu’s-su’ud faced was that this was, just with the case of cash waqf, never 
authorized in Hanafi law. He resorted to hiyal as a tool to circumvent the Islamic legal 
doctrine that forbids the usage of riba. He placed emphasis on the concept of mu’amala 
shari’ya instead.492 Even though there was a fluctuation in the rate of interests on loan, in 
1565, the rate was set at 15%.493 He issued a fatwa in response to a question asking what 
would happen to a person who carries out a transaction at a 20% interest rate, stating that, 
“a severe chastisement and a long imprisonment are necessary. He should be released 
when his reform becomes apparent.”494 Even though mu’amala shari’ya was legalized, 
there were still efforts to impose limitations and control the money market. Imber 
contends that, “Ebu’s-su’ud in fact had a more urgent and…more practical concern than 
																																																								
488 Heyd, Old Ottoman Criminal Law, p. 122. 
489 Rafeq, Abdul-Karim. “The Syrian ‘Ulama, Ottoman Law, and Islamic Sharia.” Turcica, Revue d’Etudes 
Turques, vol. 26, 1994, p-9-32. 
490 Ibid., p. 13. 
491 Ibid., 
492 Imber, Ebu’s-Su’ud, p. 145. 
493 Ibid. 
494 Ibis., 145-146. 
104		
concealing interest, and this was to prevent extortion by controlling the percentage at 
which it was payable.”495  
  
II. The Qadi  
When discussing what has been since the Umayyad period the essence of the judicial 
establishment, it is difficult to place the qadiship within the framework of change and 
development the same way one could when examining the evolutions in the institution of 
muftiship. Seeing as that the institution of the seyhulislam was chiefly an Ottoman 
innovation, it was less challenging to offer a clear-cut outline of the pre and post Ottoman 
bureaucratization and institutionalization of the office. However, the same does not 
readily apply to the office of qadi given that its foundation could be traced back to the 
Umayyad period. This section will nevertheless attempt to pinpoint the main junctures of 
developments of the qadiship during the Ottoman period and the important place it 
fulfilled in the legal system of administration.  
 Upon examining the evolution of the office of qadi over the centuries and up to 
the Ottoman period, one often comes across the Max Weber theory of kadijustiz (qadi 
justice).496 It serves to point out here briefly the workings of this Weberian system. He 
believed that the development and evolution of law was dependent on rationality and 
predictability, which hence set forth the 16th Century rise of capitalism in the West.497 On 
the other hand, he held the conviction that Islamic law was not based on the same merits. 
The notion of kadijustiz prescribed that, as quoted by Elyse Semerdjian, “judges [in 
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Islamic society] never refer to a settled group of norms or rules but are simply licensed to 
decide each case according to what they see as its individual merits.”498 This dictated a 
system where the qadi was not actively engaged in a guided and canonized system of 
rules; that his judgments were based on arbitrariness and his authority unbounded.499 He 
acted on his own instincts where his swift and uncalculated judgments were final and 
could not be appealed. 500  Thus, “Islamic law was judicially primitive and 
undeveloped.”501 However, many contemporary scholars have risen against the Weberian 
kadijustiz with intricate studies on the adequacy of Islamic law as a positivist law.502 
Nonetheless, the purpose here is not to delve into the refutations and the sociological 
arguments that developed against the viability of the Weberian notion of kadijustiz, but 
rather to give a brief idea when moving forward with examining the evolution in the 
office of the qadi that the Ottoman judiciary was not a stagnant form of legal body but 
was one that was adaptable and capable of change and development. It was not one that 
was generally based on arbitrariness or the whimsical character of the qadi. On the 
contrary, as Pierce argues, the personality and integrity of the qadi played an important 
aspect in legal practice and the quality of the administration of justice.503 Thus, there was 
emphasis that was placed in Islam on the etiquette that a qadi should retain as well as 
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certain qualities—seven in number according to Al Mawardi504—that would make him 
eligible to becoming a qadi.  
 The qadi serves as one of the most important elements in understanding the 
dynamic relations between the Ottoman state and its subjects seeing as that he was 
stationed at the center of the government, society, and law. The office of the qadi and the 
prominent place it came to retain by the Ottoman period is closely interconnected with 
the state’s many attempts to standardize the law of procedure and to integrate people 
within the state structure by placing a court and a qadi in every province. As the enforcer 
of the law, the qadi was considered as an integral component in the establishment and 
centralization of the Ottoman administration.505 However, in order to work out the degree 
of developments undertaken by this office by the 16th Century as well as the innovations 
introduced to it, it is interesting to trace back the developments it sustained in the pre-
Ottoman period.  
 The classical tradition of appointing the qadi has been long before the Ottomans a 
prerogative of the ruling authorities.506 Under the Umayyad rule (661-750), the qadi 
exercised an important role in the formulation of Islamic law. He relied on his 
independent reasoning based on a combination of ethical traditions derived from the 
Qur’an and traditional practices extracted from other legal systems.507 Nonetheless, with 
the materialization of more coherent doctrines of the four Sunni schools of law and the 
articulation of a hierarchy of authorities regarding the interpretation of the law, the qadi 
gradually lost his capacity as a mujtahid. This prerogative went to the muftis whereas the 
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qadi became the enforcer of the law and not the interpreter of it.508 Those judicial 
transformations took place shortly after the mihna (failure of inquisition) in 849 under the 
Abbasids.509 Before moving further, it is important to note here other developments that 
unfolded at the onset of the reign of the Abbasids (750-1258) and before the changes in 
the judiciary of 849.  
 Under the Abbasids, the judiciary was organized and put in order for the first 
time. Earlier during the Umayyad period, the qadi acted as the legal advisor of the 
governors.510 However, the qadi ceased exercising this function and by the Abbasid 
period, his functions became more closely tied to the shari’a where he was to adjudicate 
only in accordance to the sacred doctrine from the moment he assumed qadiship until he 
was released from his duties.511 Even though the qadi employed a degree of independence 
wherein the authorities could not interfere in his affairs, his jurisdiction was limited when 
it came to matters of criminal procedures. Seeing as that the administration of justice in 
criminal affairs did not directly fall within the bounds of the shari’a—and the qadi’s 
judgments were confined by the shari’a—the qadi came to rely on other official 
authorities and the caliph for the enforcement of his sentences in regards to criminal 
matters. This opted for the increased intervention of official authorities in the office of the 
qadi wherein the qadi became easily subject to dismissals.512 This form of administration 
of justice executed by the caliph and his state officials came to be known as siyasa—
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“state policy…and…the right of the ruler and his agents to impose discretionary 
punishment.”513 
 Nevertheless, the Abbasids moved towards the creation of a centralized institution of 
qadiship. This is seen in the establishment of the office of the chief qadi (qadi al-qudat) 
who served as the Caliph’s subordinate in regards to appointments and dismissals of 
qadis as well as other judicial officials, which became one of his chief tasks.514 He also 
acted as the Caliph’s counselor in all matters regarding justice.515 In spite of the 
institutionalization of the office of the qadi, there were other developments undertaken 
during the Abbasids that coincided with its centralization. The creation of the mazalim 
tribunals (courts of appeal) is one important aspect of those developments that will be 
mentioned here. The mazalim courts functioned separately from the qadi’s tribunals. The 
sultan himself presided over the mazalim courts or delegated his officials to hear 
subjects’ complaints against the injustices or wrongful sentences passed by qadis or 
executive officials. The creation of such a tribunal to a degree hindered the authority the 
qadi exercised wherein certain cases regarding’s property for instance were meant to fall 
under the jurisdiction of the qadi court but were nevertheless dealt with in the mazalim 
courts. Moreover, seeing as that the qadi courts (or shari’a courts) operated within the 
scope of the shari’a, there were matters that could not be brought before the qadi. Thus, 
the mazalim courts functioned as a supplementary organ dealing with lawsuits that the 
qadi courts fell short of.  																																																								
513 Masud, Khalid, Rudolph Peters, and David S. Powers. “Qadis and their Courts: An Historical Survey,” 
in Dispensing Justice in Islam: Qadis and their Judgments. Eds. Muhammad Khalid Masud, Rudolph 
Peters, and David S. Powers. Leiden: Brill, 2006, p. 12. 
514 Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law. P. 50-1. 
515 Masud, Peters, and Powers, “Qadis and their Courts,” p. 12. The nature of the office of the qadi as a 
whole changed in some respects after the mihna. Despite having exercised a degree of independence, the 
qadi’s appointment became based on his degree of loyalty to the caliph and his willingness to enforce his 
policies and religious ideals. (13) 
109		
This dichotomy of the administration of justice was to continue on under the Mamluk 
Sultanate.516 However, the mazalim courts were abolished under the Ottomans in the 
reformulation and development of the Ottoman judicial system, which put an end to the 
separation of tribunals. The Ottomans gave the shari’a courts of the qadis superiority by 
creating one court that dealt with both the secular and shari’a matters and abolishing the 
mazalim tribunals.517 This could be reflected in one of the main objectives of the Ottoman 
restructuring of the judiciary, which was to standardize and systematize the legal system 
of administration.518 The pre-Ottoman period suffered from a plurality in the number of 
those who administered justice. Thus, the emphasis that was placed on the role the qadi 
exercised aimed at creating a more consistent and coherent system of judicial 
procedures.519 The practice of placing the qadi’s office at the heartland of the state’s 
administration was one way of permanently integrating it into the apparatus of the state in 
the refining period of the Ottoman Empire. Gerber adds that one reason for the elevation 
of the office of the qadi was to counterbalance the degree of authority the religious 
bureaucracy exercised.520  
 A clearer understanding of the nature of the office of the qadi and its functions under the 
Ottomans is of importance here. Seeing as that the Ottomans opted for the amalgamation 
of the functions of the mazalim and shari’a courts into one court under the qadi’s 
jurisdiction, the qadi’s role was broadened to include that of a “civil administrator” 																																																								
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besides his role as an enforcer of the religious law.521 His most crucial function was the 
operation of the court, which was also extended to deal with criminal and secular matters 
that were not necessarily bound by the shari’a laws.522 Other than overseeing the affairs 
of the court and adjudicating lawsuits, the qadi performed other legal formalities that 
involved registering marriage contracts, the selling and buying of property, as well as 
registering loans.523 He also played a role in the distribution of inheritance, administering 
waqfs, and the regulation of taxation levels.524 Furthermore, the qadi served as the legal 
guardian for orphans, brides, and those who had no guardians.525 He was assigned to 
carry out inspections and submit a report (However, this was particularly a function of the 
provincial qadi).526 Additionally, the qadi acted as a mediator between disputing parties 
before taking the case to court.527 The broadening of the functions and role of the qadi 
situated him and his court at the locus of the judicial system, which was an Ottoman 
innovation that was unprecedented in Islam.528 Taking on responsibilities that went 
beyond the enforcement of the shari’a depicts the increased secular role the qadi came to 
fulfill as a civil administrator. However, it is important to note here that despite the 
amplification of his office and the upsurge in the multitude of tasks he came to hold, the 
qadi remained first and foremost a subordinate of the sultan. He was his representative, 																																																								
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empowered to execute and enforce the sultanic decrees.529 The qadi obtained his orders 
and authority directly from the sultan and could personally petition him without a 
mediator in between them.530  
In their efforts to standardize and centralize the law of procedure throughout the 
empire, the Ottomans sent a copy of the kanunname to every qadi’s court.531 The kanun 
specifically pinpoints the functions and role of the qadi in enforcing the law. Gerber 
contends that “[this indicates] that the Ottomans certainly intended the kadi, and as a rule 
no other authority, to apply the kanun.”532 However, the sultan ordered the Viziers too to 
administer justice according to both the shari’a and the kanun;533 but the innovation here 
is in the development discerned in the broadening of the authority of the qadi by 
instructing him to enforce his judgments according to both laws. This is reiterated in a 
number of kanuns, where the qadi is enjoined to carry out his investigations “according to 
the shari’a and the kanun,” or “according to the noble shari’a and the kanunname 
deposited in the law-courts” as stated in the text of the law code.534 The preface of the 
Ottoman Criminal Code complied by one of the clerks in a shari’a court in the 17th 
Century states that:  
The judges of the sacred law are not restricted to hearing shari’a cases 
only but are appointed and ordered to decide disputes and terminate 
litigation in regard to both shari’a and ‘urf matters. Therefore, just as on 
shari’a questions fikh works are studied, so it is considered [their] duty in 
regard to ‘urf matters to study the registers of the Sultan’s kanuns.535    
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This delineates the power and jurisdiction bestowed on the qadi in overseeing the 
execution of the shari’a laws as well as the sultanic decrees. In certain cases, the qadis 
responded and adjudicated on lawsuits that were governed only by the kanun.536 When 
there was no sufficient evidence for the qadi to pronounce a shari’a judgment, he did so 
in accordance to the kanun.537 When the matter was not evidently clear in the kanun 
provisions, he sent to the capital for a judgment and executed the sentence that he 
consequently received.538 Having the kanun at their disposal, the qadis exercised a broad 
discretionary form of authority that was different from earlier periods in Islam.  
Furthermore, in endowing the qadi with such powers under the Ottoman law, it is 
interesting to see the nature of the relationship between the qadis and the executive 
officials that throve from such regulations. Both qadis and the executive officials 
exercised the authority of administering justice on the sultan’s behalf. The different 
functions between the two are highlighted in the kanunname of the 17th Century wherein 
the qadis “are to carry out the laws of the shari’a…but are ordered to refer matters 
relating to public order, the protection and defence of the subjects, and the capital or 
corporal punishment (siyaset) [of criminals] to the [local] representatives of the sultan, 
who are the governors in charge of military and serious penal affairs.” By order of the 
sultan, those were the two authorities to administer justice in the provinces. The executive 
official (governors, Viziers, and other high-ranking officials)539 represented the sultan’s 
executive authority, whereas the qadi represented his legal authority. 540  Despite 
exercising the sultan’s executive authority, the sultan’s officials’ powers were to a degree 																																																								
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limited by the new kanun provisions. The governors were the qadis’ real contenders. 
They seized some of the functions and authorities that the qadis employed.541 Thus, one 
of the main goals of Suleyman I’s series of reforms in the 16th Century was to curtail the 
power of the executive officials. This was done through giving the qadis the capacity to 
oversee the legality of the executive officials’ actions. One of the means in which the 
kanun kept the latter’s authority in check was by entrusting the qadi with a number of 
prerogatives that the executive officials first had to go through before taking certain 
measures. The qadis were thus placed in charge of overseeing the actions of the executive 
officials who had to take permission from the qadi before imprisoning or torturing 
suspects for confessions.542 Nevertheless, not all executive officials were pleased with 
such judicial dominance and power being usurped from them. Some even went as far as 
petitioning the sultan against being put through the innovation of being judged by a 
qadi,543 which in all probability they deemed to be inferior to them. 
 However, the executive officials still retained some power over the qadi. 
According to the kanun criminal code, in the case where the qadi examined the evidence 
of the case and reached the conclusion that the evidence were not sufficient enough for 
him to carry out a shari’a punishment, he would then write a certificate (huccet) detailing 
the statements of the case without suggesting a suitable sentence, and would in turn hand 
the case over to the executive officials who would then administer a siyasa 
punishment.544 The final sentence, however, was the qadi’s and not the executive 
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official’s.545 Moreover, the qadi possessed the capacity of supervising financial affairs546 
and he was the one responsible for collecting local tax revenues and handed them over to 
the governor to hand over to the military.547 It had to first go through the qadi who would 
directly report any illegal actions committed by the executive officials.548 It is important 
to note further the kind of functions the executive official administered in order to 
delineate the differences between him and the qadi. According to Jennings, he cites that, 
“The principal duties of the sancak begi (the governor of a sancak) did not go beyond, 
from the military point of view, going on campaign at the head of the timar-holding 
spahis; from the administrative point of view, putting into force the police matters of 
cities in the sancak; and protecting the tranquility of the timar lands providing soldiers 
(more correctly, of the revenues which do not have the right of independence). All 
matters outside of these two duties lay within the authority of the kadi of every judicial 
district.”549 Thus, this division of tasks was an essential aspect of aiming to develop a just 
administrative system, by keeping the authority of both functionaries constantly in check.  
 Another significant innovation that was introduced by the Ottoman authorities 
concerning the office of the qadi was the introduction of courthouses for the first time. 
This was true in regards to the Arab provinces. There already existed judicial districts 
headed each by a qadi in Anatolia.550 However, the case was different under the 
Mamluks. The Mamluk four qadi al-qudat usually had designated buildings used as 
courthouses. As for the other qadis, seeing as that they were not compelled to convene in 																																																								
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a specific place, they held sessions in their places of residence or in mosques. With the 
Ottoman conquests of 1516 and 1517, courthouses were introduced in different districts 
of the provinces.551 This was one way of encouraging the public to take their disputes to 
the court before the qadi. 552  It also emphasized the qadi’s image as a “public 
prosecutor”553 and his importance in dispute resolutions. Furthermore, as previously 
mentioned in Chapter 1, the Ottomans abolished the plural legal system of having four 
qadi al-qudat represent each Sunni school of law and appointed one chief Hanafi qadi to 
represent the Ottoman official school. The sultan-appointed chief qadi usually served a 
term of one year and was normally a Turk.554 Being of non-Arab origins did not give 
much room for him to get accustomed with the local practices and traditions. This might 
have been one way of maintaining a form of neutrality between the judge and the subjects 
when it comes to adjudicating lawsuits. Moreover, by placing one Hanafi chief qadi, the 
Ottomans ensured that the Hanafi’s position was elevated above that of the other 
schools.555 Despite having abolished the plural system of the Mamluks, there were deputy 
qadis (na’ibs) representing the four schools placed in each courthouse and usually served 
for life.556 Likewise, being appointed to an important province served as a medium for the 
chief qadi to attain higher positions in the future such as becoming kadi-‘asker.557  
 What is concluded from the Ottomanization of the judiciary and the introduction 
of new policies is that the Ottoman authorities opted for creating a standardized system 
that would be closely linked to the central government. The qadis appointed by the 																																																								
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authorities were usually “trained and dispatched from the Ottoman government.”558 
Perhaps this served as a stepping-stone to infiltrate the newly appropriated territories with 
“Ottomanism,” given that the appointment of qadis were not arbitrary and was based on 
centralized procedural appointments highly controlled by the government.559 Another 
way of standardizing judicial procedure and bringing in line the different provinces of the 
empire was introducing the system of record keeping. During the Mamluks, qadis 
recorded the cases in their personal documents, which they kept at home. This changed 
under the Ottomans, where each courthouse had to have a register of court records drawn 
up by the qadi and his assistants.560 This form of bureaucratization was once again an 
effort of standardizing procedure throughout the provinces, which would make “legal 
transactions…universally recognized.”561 This meant, as brought to attention by Hanna, 
“a person could, in one of the courts of Cairo, buy a house in Damascus.”562    
The Question of Judicial Corruption  
Noel J. Coulson’s article “Doctrine and Practice in Islamic Law: One Aspect of the 
Problem,” evokes the important question of judicial corruption. He argues that in the 
early period of Islam, there was widespread contempt and fear amongst people of 
becoming a qadi. He provides many cases that prove the extent of this aversion towards 
the post, nominally as it was believed to contradict piety and moved towards “worldly 
advancements and material gain.”563 That even if a qadi who has been nominated was 
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pious, the post itself would lead to ruin regardless.564 Pierce explains that, “According to 
Hanafi tradition, two of the school’s founding fathers had to be beaten or imprisoned 
before they could be induced to accept the office of the judge.”565 This abhorrence 
towards the office of the qadi might have been to an extent exaggerated; however, it still 
calls into question the emphasis that was placed on the integrity of the qadi. The religious 
scholars were often reluctant to accept the office of the qadi because it meant that they 
were yielding to “worldly concessions” by accepting being paid in return for their 
services as well as being at times challenged by producing just sentences.566 In order to 
avoid bribery, qadis were forbidden to accept gifts or private invitations.567 Thus, not 
only was the qualification of a qadi necessary in assuming office, but also his character. 
By the same token, the Ottoman authorities placed the same emphasis on the integrity of 
the qadi by entrusting him with such prerogatives as previously mentioned. Achieving 
justice was in large dependent on the rectitude of the qadi.568  
This daunting rhetoric of doubt of the qadi’s integrity resonated well into the 
Ottoman period. In a fatwa by Ebu’s-su’ud, he implicitly emits the view that muftis are 
generally considered to be of a more honorable standing than qadis seeing as that their 
appointments are not dictated by a systematic judicial procedure but rather based on 
eminence of their “personal qualifications;” and that their opinions are based on religious 
texts unlike the sentences of the judges.569 To what extent were those the real intentions 
of the fatwa of Ebu’s-su’ud as explained by Pierce could be contended. However, it still 
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indicates that there was a problem in regards to the qadi’s conduct in office. It is true that 
some indeed misused their positions of power. Heyd contends that the 16th Century saw 
the decline of the qadi where there was a growing tendency to seek the office of the qadi; 
some “even paid bribes to obtain them.”570 The corruption of the office in part emanated 
from, as Heyd further argues, the lack of being paid a sufficient salary. In compliance 
with the kanun, the authorities permitted the qadi to take money from recipients as free 
gifts in the issuance of certificates for instance based on the recipient’s own free will.571 
However, it is alleged that some qadis abused this by unlawful fees and regarding them as 
otherwise on the basis that they are given as free gifts. Hence, the qadis would try to 
adjudicate on as many cases as they could to obtain money.572 Moreover, they were said 
to go on visits in their respective locality and usurp illegal fines and fees from people.573 
There was an overall willingness of qadis to accept bribes. When it came to administering 
justice and bringing offenders before the law, Heyd alleges that some qadis failed to do 
so. In a case that he relates to is of a Bursa qadi in the 16th Century who refused to report 
to the government the wrongdoings of robbers in his locality claiming, “I fear for my 
heard.”574 Consequently, it is argued that people began to lose their trust in the judicial 
system and preferred to keep some matters private rather than bringing their cases for 
investigation before the qadi.575 
Besides the court records, the Şikayet Defterleri (Registers of Complaints) is one 
way that helps in better formulating the question of corruption of the qadi’s office. The 
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extent of the qadi’s corruption and loss of integrity might be at times exaggerated. 
However, the petitions brought against the qadis by state subjects produce evidence that 
corruption of the judiciary did indeed exist. According to Gerber, “corruption and bribery 
by judges were often viewed as the root cause of other major types of decline and 
disintegration.”576 Hence the link that is often drawn between the rhetoric of decline of 
the 16th Century and the disintegration of the qadis and governors.577 However, the 
emphasis here is usually placed on the corruption of the qadis more than the governors, 
possibly because of the significance and urgency placed on the qadi having to always 
retain a just image as the prosecutor. Based on a study of the registers of complaints by 
Gerber, he notes that there were 71 complaints against qadis and a much higher number 
against governors. Very few of those complaints were against qadis holding office in 
large cities, which indicates that there was more pressure in the central areas of the 
empire on qadis maintain their integrity. However, upon examining the nature of those 
complaints, Gerber concluded that there was a lack of explicit complaints sustaining that 
qadis adjudicated unfairly for the sake of bribes. The bulk of complaints involved the 
qadis obtaining illegal taxes. Moreover, based on his studies of thousands of Bursa court 
records, Gerber argues that the qadi system was considered fair for the most part and that 
the registers of complaints predominantly imply that even though there was indeed a 
problem, it did not warrant deeming the whole system as corrupt.  
However, two arguments could be raised here. Firstly, as noted in the previous 
chapter, the process of petitioning was a costly one; thus, not everyone was capable of 
sending petitions to the capital. Moreover, as Inalcik had stated, justice was considered to 																																																								
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be greater near the capital,578 meaning that the far off provinces had a difficulty in 
utilizing the system of petitioning. Secondly, Gerber’s study of the Bursa court records, 
while they might be an accurate indication of what took place in 17th Century Bursa, it is 
certainly not an accurate indication of what took place in other provinces. As such, in 
order to reach the conclusion in regards to the question of judicial corruption being a 
reality or not, one must venture on a closer examination of court records and other 
possibly existing personal journals from different areas of the empire to deduce the reality 
of the problem.     
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CHAPTER 4: LAW IN PRACTICE: REGULATING 
MORALITY 	
The recount of one of the renowned Mamluk stories, as told by Ibn Iyas and cited by 
Rapoport, serves as an interesting beginning for the buildup of this chapter. In 1513, 
Sultan Qanush sentenced two adulterers to death amidst altercations that took place 
between himself and a number of jurists. On the 4th of December of that year, a wife of a 
Hanafi deputy qadi, Ghars al-din Khalil, summoned her lover, Nur al-Din al-Mashali—a 
Shafi’i deputy qadi—to her house in the absence of her husband who was expected to be 
away for the whole night.579 After being informed of the visit by a neighbor, Khalil went 
back to his house to find his wife in bed with al-Mashali. Refusing to be silenced by both 
al-Mashali’s and Khalil’s wife’s offers of one thousand dinars and all her trousseau of 
household belongings out of fear for their reputation, the infuriated Khalil locked them 
both in the house and went to the military chamberlain’s court to issue a complaint 
against them.580 When al-Mashali was confronted with the accusations, he confessed and 
was sentenced along with Khalil’s wife to be stripped and beaten. As a sign of 
humiliation, both publicly rode donkeys backwards in the city and were fined 100 dinars 
each. When the wife claimed that she had no money, Khalil was ordered to pay the fine, 
and was arrested when he did not.581 When Sultan al-Ghawri learnt of the story of the 
adulterers, he ordered that the two be stoned in accordance with the shari’a, which was a 
rather uncommon form of punishment that rarely took place at the time.582 In response, 
the ulama issued a fatwa rendering the sultan’s sentence invalid on the account that al-																																																								
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Mashali had withdrawn his confession and on the basis that there was a lack of evidence 
in accordance with the shari’a to prove the act of fornication took place.583 Carrying on 
back and forth with the altercations between the sultan and the ulama, the latter declared 
that the sultan would be legally responsible for paying blood money if the pair was 
executed. Angered by the ulama, whom he called “senseless fools,” the sultan dismissed 
all four qadi al-qudat and ordered the execution of al-Mashali and Khalil’s wife. Their 
bodies were left to hang for two days at the house of one of the ulama who had protested 
against the sultan’s sentence.584  
 In order to proceed with placing the story within the context of the Ottoman 
framework, a few aspects of relevance here have to be taken into consideration. First off, 
when Khalil was offered to settle the matter with al-Mashali between the three of them, 
the former refused and still chose to take the matter to court. This is an indication that by 
the 16th Century the state played an important role in regulating morality and what was 
once kept within the bounds of the household. However, an important aspect has to be 
contemplated here: this case involved deputy qadis who by all means, in theory, should 
have possessed the highest form of integrity. Moreover, it prompted the involvement of 
the sultan who showed his discontent towards the ulama for choosing a person like al-
Mashali as a deputy qadi. Thus, it was apparently a high profile case and it does not 
necessarily mean that all matters of zina (fornication) were dealt with in the same 
manner. Secondly, this story is also an indication that the concept of fining the 
perpetrators did exist during the Mamluks. What system of fining the Mamluks followed 
or upon what basis they chose to fine the two 100 dinars is not of importance here. What 																																																								
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is of relevance is that the notion of fining was used as a method of punishment. Lastly, 
the lack of evidence in accordance with Islamic law seems to have served as an important 
aspect of the ulama’s argumentation against the sultan’s decision for execution.  
Even though the purpose here is not to offer an in depth analysis of the forms of 
punishments that took place during the Mamluks, this story serves as an interesting point 
of departure in understanding how the Ottoman legal system developed in terms of 
regulating its subjecting and bringing the private to the public sphere. Despite the 
existence of a court during the Mamluk sultanate, the degree of accessibility to 
courthouses increased dramatically by the 16th Century under the Ottomans.585 This was 
owed to the upsurge in the number of courthouses and their introduction for the first time 
in some of the provinces of the Ottoman Empire, which encouraged more people to use 
the courts in settling their disputes.586 Moreover, in regards to sentencing the offenders to 
the payment of fines, this practice became an integral part in the Ottoman legal code and 
was broadened to include a large number of crimes.587 It was systematized under the 
Ottomans in such a way that it almost became the most common form of punishment. 
Additionally, the issue of ‘evidence’ in Islamic jurisprudence when it comes to proving 
cases of fornication is of significance here seeing as that it perhaps played a role in part of 
the introduction of kanuns that served as a tool in policing morality.   
What follows in this chapter is an in depth analysis of three Ottoman legal 
innovations in the fields of marriage, zina, and prostitution that changed the course of 
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regulating the public behavior.588 The previous chapters were an attempt to analyze the 
introduction of certain features that took part in the establishment of the Ottoman legal 
administration in order to fully grasp how law was imposed from above by the state 
functionaries. This chapter will follow suit by aiming to assess the repercussions of the 
implementation of the new Ottoman kanuns and to examine how society came to interact 
and function within the realm of the Ottoman system of administration on the grassroot 
level. Moreover, it will explicate further how the newly codified and more 
comprehensive Ottoman legal codes brought about changes in the law of procedure as 
well as dealt with cases that were not expanded on in the shari’a and were not easily 
enforceable, bearing in mind that the regulations that will be studied here were attempts 
by the Ottoman authorities to standardize the way societal behavioral patterns were dealt 
with. 
Marriage Fees  
The Ottoman introduction of ‘fiscalized’ policies were not only limited to the type of 
punishments that were prescribed against offenders. In the Ottomanization process of the 
judicial system, the Ottoman authorities introduced yet another notable innovation to the 
courthouses. People who went to court were now obligated to pay a fee for every case.589 
A fee was designated depending on each case that came to court, and in every courthouse, 
there was an Ottoman employee (shawish) who was responsible for collecting the fees.590 
The fees were then divided among the indigenous staff working in the courthouse, the 
Hanafi qadi al-qudat, and the sultan. Moreover, the local qadis’ incomes highly depended 																																																								
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on those fees seeing as they were not paid by the state.591 This was not a novelty that was 
introduced only in the Arab provinces, but in all provinces of the empire as an attempt of 
standardizing the law of procedure.592 One reason for the introduction of this policy that 
Hanna gives is that “perhaps because the Ottoman officials wanted the judiciary system 
to pay for itself.”593 This serves as one example of imposing changes on society that was 
not welcomed by the state’s subjects. Not only were people forced to pay a fee when 
going to court, they were enjoined by law to bring certain cases to be registered by the 
court.594 Marriage was one such case. 
 Every shari’a court by law became responsible for recording and registering 
contracts and all forms of dealings that came before the court.595 Registering and 
applying a fee for marriage contracts was the first type of fees to be instilled by the 
court.596 This was certainly an Ottoman innovation that was unheard of in Islam. There is 
no record in the shari’a doctrine that necessitates the drawing up of a marriage contract, 
let alone for marriage to be registered by a court.597 In Islam, a marriage was regarded as 
a private form of agreement that entailed “a silver ring or a recitation from the Qur’an as 
an adequate fee.”598 It neither required any judicial involvement in drawing up a marriage 
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nor did it require a marriage to be registered in any way.599 In one of the fatwa of Ebu’s-
su’ud, he reiterates the obligatory registration of marriage. The fatwa is as follows:  
Q: Now that a Sultanic decree has been issued [commanding] that no 
marriage be concluded without the cognizance of a judge, is a marriage 
[concluded] without such a cognizance valid? 
A: No, lest it give rise to dispute and litigation.600   
 
This might have been one way of administering and controlling the local judicial systems 
and bringing them in line with those of the other provinces.601 Perhaps another reason is, 
as implied from the fatwa of Ebu’s-su’ud, that the registration of marriage acted as a form 
of evidence in case disputes broke out.602 Moreover, it is noteworthy to underline here 
that consummating marriages through formal means by state officials served as a way of 
regulating societal behavioral patterns. Even if that was not the chief reason, the changes 
instituted acted as a method of preventing “irregular or illicit unions”603 and regulating 
the public’s morality. Thus, the Ottoman state was bringing the institution of marriage 
from the private to the public sphere and restraining the subjects’ sexual conduct.  
 What effects did those changes have on the public is of significance here. Taking 
on the case of Egypt, one can discern how the class of ulama reacted to the innovations 
introduced by the Ottoman authorities. With the state taking up the role of regulating 
public morality, the indigenous ulama were marginalized. When it came to matters of 
administering justice, the ulama in Egypt were greatly impacted by the Ottoman 
conquests of 1517. The innovations laid out by the Ottoman authorities did not only 																																																								
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restrict the ulama in the sphere of drawing up marriages—who they regarded as an illegal 
form of taxation—, but also negatively effected them in regards to appointing one Hanafi 
qadi al-qudat, who was higher in rank than the local deputy qadis.604 As such, a number 
of qadis were dismissed from their posts. Moreover, there was growing fear that the other 
schools of law besides the official Hanafi madhhab would be discontinued and that the 
Ottoman kanun would replace the shari’a.605  
Even though those might have all been attempts to centralize state power in the 
provinces and to unify the legal administration, the changes introduced were met with 
great discontent and it was not a challenge-free process on the part of the Ottomans. 
When it came to the unwelcomed innovation of marriage, both the Azhar and Syrian 
ulama came to regard the imposition of marriage fees as a fitna “to which no other fitna 
could be compared.”606 They believed that marriage was not a matter of the judiciary.607 
What further constituted part of the ulama’s disgruntlement was also the fact that 
registering marriages in a court or through Ottoman functionaries meant that the local 
ulama became deprived of the profits they acquired from drawing up marriages. This was 
not a matter that they could overlook and hence brought their complaints to the 
authorities. Selim I, who was sultan at the time, dismissed the deputy qadis in response 
along with their witnesses and appointed an Ottoman qadi al-qudat (known as qadi al-
‘Arab) to preside over the court and to oversee the legal administration, and who also in 
turn appointed witnesses of his own choosing.608 A part from those mentioned earlier 
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whom the court paid for, the newly appointed witnesses also received money from the 
revenue generated by the marriage fees.609 Despite no longer retaining the role of drawing 
up marriages, some ulama continued to do so in secret.610 However, when a Shafi’i 
deputy qadi drew up a marriage contract in secret against the decrees of the sultan, “he 
was beaten by the Ottoman judge and paraded bare-headed through the streets of 
Cairo.”611 What further escalated the tensions was that several ulama were sent to 
Istanbul in what was regarded as them being exiled.612 Moreover, seeing as that by 1521, 
the deputy qadis and the witnesses were still not allowed to sit in the Salihiyya madrasa, 
marriage contracts were concluded in the houses of one of the deputy judges.613 However, 
the Ottoman authorities tight control was seen even in overseeing the process of 
concluding a marriage. Troops and representatives assigned by the chief of police were 
ordered to sit outside the houses of the four deputy qadis and collect the fees from the 
marriage contracts concluded.614 The fee of a virgin bride in local currency was set at 60 
nisfs, while that of a previously married woman was set at 30 nisfs.615 Furthermore, a 
hundred ulama took to the governor of Egypt at the time, Kha’ir Bey, entreating him to 
retract the fees on marriage, which they believed to have completely contradicted the 
shari’a. However, he dismissed their appeals. 616  Thus, they challenged the newly 
enacted decrees by withholding to marry or divorce anyone and an Azhari shakykh even 
went as far as referring to what was known as al-yasaq al-uthmani (Ottoman provisions) 
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as yasaq al-kufr. He was imprisoned as a result but was later set free when the ulama 
intervened.617    
 Further changes took place in Egypt after Suleyman I became sultan. Under the 
provisions of new sultanic decrees, a kadi-‘asker was ordered to “replace the four 
Egyptian deputy judges and discharge judicial business on behalf of all four Sunni 
schools of law.” This once again reconfigured the structure of the deputy qadis and their 
witnesses. The new laws dictated the appointment of one deputy qadi from each 
madhhab with two witnesses instead of ten for each qadi. Furthermore, any judicial 
business that does not first go through the kadi’-asker would be invalidated.618 The 
appointment of the deputy qadis was the prerogative of the kadi-‘asker who ordered them 
to sit in the Salihiyya madrasa with the Hanafi deputy qadi in charge of overseeing and 
monitoring all judicial matters.619 However, seeing the growing discontent of the local 
ulama, the government attempted to make concessions by lowering the marriage fees and 
dividing them on the basis of two categories. A virgin bride from the ‘common’ class was 
to pay 43 nisfs while a divorcée or a widow was to pay 22 nisfs in addition to other fees 
that would go to the witnesses and qadis involved in drawing up the contract.620  
 Cutting down on marriage fees served as a temporary solution. The changes 
introduced by the new kanunnames were met with opposition. People were resisting the 
novelties that the Ottoman practices injected their society with. Abdul-Karim Rafeq notes 
that, “marriage procedures became so complicated that people preferred to remain 
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single.”621 One other possible reason for institutionalizing marriage was perhaps owed to 
the fact that with the legal plural system that existed under the Mamluk four qadi al-
qudat, people exploited that they could maneuver around with the madhhabs: getting 
married in accordance to one and divorced the next day in accordance to another based on 
what was more of benefit to them. With the new fees imposed, not everyone could afford 
getting married and people grew more reluctant to do so. Thus, as a result, a class in 
society disappeared from the marriage scene.  
Zina (Fornication)  
The early codification of kanun aimed to deal with cases that were not clearly established 
in the shari’a and attempted to create forms of punishments that could be readily 
enforceable. With the creation of a more comprehensive and elaborative criminal code, 
the kanunnames of Suleyman I and his predecessors allowed for the state to play an 
integral role in the way justice was administered through covering a broader range of 
criminal transgressions where the shari’a fell short.622 What is of importance to examine 
here is how the state became so involved in sexual discourse and how morality was 
regulated through publicizing what was once private. The controversial case of zina 
serves as one example of how the state policed the sexual arena vis-à-vis the kanun.  
 Zina is illegal sexual intercourse that occurs outside marriage or concubinage. 
According to the shari’a doctrine, zina is one of the crimes that fall under the hudud 
punishments that entail lashing or stoning to death.623 A man commits zina when he 
engages in sexual intercourse with someone other than his four wives or concubines, 																																																								
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while a woman does so when she engages in intercourse with someone other than her 
husband.624 Gender, marital status, class, age, and religion play an important role in 
categorizing how zina is dealt with. In compliance with the laws of the shari’a, it makes a 
difference if the offender was: man or woman; married or unmarried; free or slave; adult 
or minor; or Muslim or non-Muslim.625  
 The Hanafi legal tradition lays down a number of provisions that deal with zina. 
When it comes to the issue of evidence, the Hanafi doctrine takes into account the 
testimony of four well-reputed male witnesses.626 They must specify where, when, how, 
and what took place exactly before the qadi as well as identify the woman. When it has 
been established that the woman was prohibited to the offender and that the witnesses 
witnessed what took place “like the mascara-stick in the mascara-pot,” then the qadi can 
pass his sentence.627 If the witnesses giving the testimony are less than four, then they are 
considered slanders; and if they retract their testimony before the stoning takes place, the 
sentence is reverted and they (the slanders) become liable for the hadd of slander. If the 
stoning had already taken place, the ‘slanders’ are liable for the diya (blood money).628 
When it comes to the confession of the offender, the Hanafi law requires that he be a sane 
and mature man who is then asked to testify four times on four different occasions. The 
sentence of the hadd penalty is passed only when that happens. However, if the offender 
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retracts his confession before the execution of the punishment, he is set free and is no 
longer liable for hadd punishment.629  
 It is obvious that the Hanafi doctrine required strict proofs in order to establish 
that a crime of zina had been committed. There is a lot of ambiguity that surrounds zina 
when dealing with it in accordance with the shari’a law. It was difficult to establish how 
to move forward with prosecuting such a crime seeing as that the requirement of four 
witnesses to be present during the act itself and for all of them to be well-reputed men is 
rendered almost impossible. Furthermore, the fact that for a confession to be considered 
viable, the offender had to confess four different times makes it all the more difficult to 
make a conviction. One can infer that such mechanisms of ambiguity utilized by the 
Hanafi law were meant to keep sexual matters private and difficult to penalize. Another 
aspect that contributed to the ambiguity surrounding zina is the issue of quasi-ownership 
of concubines (shubhat al-milk). A man can make a number of claims over the ownership 
of women who are not his wives or concubines. One such claim is that a female slave 
might have been awarded to him as a pledge; thus, it is licit to commit sexual intercourse 
with her.630  
 The issue of same-sex intercourse is not dealt with clearly in the shari’a doctrine. 
It is not included in the penalties prescribed to zina. Thus, there have been a lot of 
deliberations surrounding this matter where some jurists believed that devising analogy 
could not be applied in the case of homosexual intercourse.631 According to Abu Hanifa 
nonetheless, he deduced that, by analogy, homosexual intercourse could be dealt with the 
same as heterosexual intercourse. However, male homosexual intercourse was still not 																																																								
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treated as a hadd offence.632 Some jurists believed that same-sex intercourse merited 
execution, while others believed that repentance was sufficient enough for eliminating the 
enforcement of punishment.633 However, the shari’a deals differently with female acts of 
homosexuality. Seeing as that no act of intercourse occurs, female homosexual acts are 
not categorized as zina and bears no form of punishment. Yet, Jurists generally condemn 
such practices wherein some believe that such they warrant a qadi’s discretionary 
punishment.634  
 Elyse Semerdjian argues that, “Ottoman law differs so drastically from the shari’a 
on the subject of punishment that one may speculate that it was an attempt to reconcile 
the law with the needs of the empire’s diverse population.”635 It is here that the Ottomans 
introduced new principles in dealing with the crime of zina. There was great emphasis 
placed on the crimes of sexual transgressions in the kanunnames of Suleyman I and his 
predecessors. The opening chapter of the Ottoman Criminal Code is titled “On 
Fornication and Other Offences.”636 It is noteworthy that there were still attempts to 
conform to the shari’a provisions in which the kanun maintained that an offender is 
punished according with its regulations only in case he was not punished under the 
shari’a first. The kanun also differentiates between different genders, classes and age as 
the shari’a does. 637  The kanun offers a distinctive form of punishment when it 
implements a penalty of affixed fines in dealing with zina set in the 35 articles of the 
Ottoman Criminal Code instead of the fixed hudud punishments prescribed by the shari’a 
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in case of conviction.638 Heyd maintains that the shift from the hudud punishments to the 
punishment by fines is owed to Abu Yusuf’s argument that a ruler was allowed to “inflict 
discretionary punishment by taking money.”639 Nonetheless, as mentioned earlier the 
shari’a doctrine mostly prescribes either flogging or stoning to death to crimes of zina. 
However, the kanunnames replaced the hudud punishments with the lighter punishment 
of fines. It did not enforce the death penalty on crimes of sexual transgressions. However, 
there were more severe punishments that were imposed on offenders who committed rape 
or abduction such as castration.640  
 There were five factors to be considered when it comes to determining the scale 
of a fine: “wealth, personal status, age, servile status, and religion.”641 A Muslim man or 
woman who is wealthy, free, and married are obligated to pay the highest fine of 300 
akçes, whereas a poor slave man is compelled to pay 25 akçes for the same crime.642 The 
practice of male homosexual intercourse is fined by way of the same scale. Nonetheless, 
under the kanun, female homosexual acts were not considered as a felony.643 Another 
difference between the kanun and the shari’a in regards to the regulation of zina is that an 
adulterous married woman must be divorced from her husband in accordance with the 
shari’a. However, the kanun necessitates that a husband must pay a fine if he chooses to 
stay married to his adulterous wife.644 According to Article 6 of the Ottoman Criminal 
Code, a man must thus pay 100 for his wife “by way of fine [imposed] on a [consenting] 
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cuckold,” and 300 akçes for himself. If he is of average standing, he is entitled to pay 50 
akçes and if he is poor he ought to pay 40 or 30 akçes.645   
 Shubha (resemblance) was yet another principle that the kanun utilized to deal 
with zina. Following a Hadith by Prophet Muhammad—“Ward off the fixed punishments 
from the Muslims on the strength of shubha as much as you can”646—shubha can be used 
as a method where there is judicial doubt to avoid being punished for zina. In such case, 
the offender usually claims that he believed that the act was licit. This happens just as in 
the case of quasi-ownership of a female slave, or if the woman and man involved believe 
they were legally married and there was no intention for them to commit zina.647 In 
Ottoman law, for the act to be considered a crime, the offender has to have intent or prior 
knowledge of the act he is committing.648 This follows the shari’a endorsement of 
shubha where in case a man retracts his confession, he is prompted to say: “Perhaps there 
was shubha, or [I] only kissed, or touched her.”649 This principle was often used and 
encouraged by jurists as a loophole in order to avoid punishment.  
 Ottoman fatwas played a role besides the kanun in regulating public morality and 
the sexual arena. A number of fatwas by the seyhulislam Ebu’s-su’ud is concerned with 
crimes of sexual transgressions. One of his fatwas considers rape as zina and prescribes 
the hadd punishment for it in conformity with the shari’a: 
Q: If Zeyd without being married to Hind takes her by force, what should 
happen to Zeyd? 																																																								
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A: If he is a muhsan [a married Muslim], he will be killed.650  
 
Another rather compelling fatwa here legalizes a woman’s killing of her husband by 
poisoning him if he divorces her and tries to commit zina with her by force. In such case, 
she is not liable for the payment of blood money, as poisoning her husband would be 
considered a case of self-defense:651  
Q: Zeyd says, “If I do this thing, may my wife be divorced three time.” He 
then does it. His wife knows this, but is unable to prove it. Is Zeyd’s wife a 
sinner because Zeyd is intimate with her? 
A: It is fornication (zina). It is essential that she does not [submit] 
voluntarily [to Zeyd’s embrace]. She must give what she has and there 
must be a khul’ divorce. If he tries to have intercourse [with her] and there 
is no other means of escape, it is licit according to the shari’a to add 
poison to his food. She would not commit a sin and there is no diya (blood 
money).652   
There are a number of differences in the way kanun and shari’a deal with crimes of 
sexual transgressions that one could recognize. Intent associated with guilt was one 
aspect that was considered in Ottoman law. If a person breaks into a house without 
committing any offence, he is still considered guilty if he had the intent of committing a 
crime.653 Following the same line of reasoning, if a man is found in a house alone with a 
woman then it is assumed that their intent was to commit zina in spite of whatever action 
was taking place. This point is different from the shari’a given that “seeing” and 
“touching” could be considered zina in accordance with Islamic legal provisions.654 
Another major aspect that underpins the dissimilarities between both legal codes is the 
imposition of fines. As mentioned in earlier chapters, one of the possible reasons behind 																																																								
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the Ottoman ‘fiscalized’ forms of punishments might have been owed to the fact that they 
were a source of revenue. Some crimes are punishable by both a form of discretionary 
punishment and a monetary fine, as shown in Article 22 of the Ottoman Criminal Code:  
“If a person has sexual intercourse with his wife’s female slave or with his 
mother’s or father’s female slave or with his wife after having divorced 
[her] irrevocably, the cadi shall chastise [him] and a fine of two akçe shall 
be collected for each stroke.”655    
 
It is important to note here that even though the fatwas of Ebu’s-su’ud often seem to 
prescribe of a hadd punishment, this was not necessarily what was applied in court. Heyd 
argues that, “Stoning to death, though prescribed in many Ottoman fatwas as the required 
penalty for certain cases of fornication, seems to have been inflicted only in very rare 
cases.”656 Thus, it seems that Ottoman law aimed at creating a more enforceable system 
of legal procedure that at times broke away from the essence of the shari’a. 
Prostitution  
Prostitution fell under the category of zina and was the subject of a lot of juristic 
deliberations. In Hanafi Legal doctrine, there have been many endeavors aimed at trying 
to pinpoint what type of crimes of sexual transgressions constituted the hadd 
punishments.657 Seeing the rigidity set forth by the shari’a in establishing a crima of zina, 
Hanafi jurists often attempts to limit the scope of what dictates a crime that necessitates a 
hadd penalty. Some were even of the opinion that such indecencies should be concealed 
so long as a case of zina could not be proven.658 One of the few cases where the shari’a 
provisions enforced a fixed punishment of eighty lashes was slander (qadhf)—falsely 																																																								
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accusing someone of committing fornication.659 However, when it comes to prostitution, 
Hanafi jurists did not consider the case as an offence that infringed on hudud Allah. As 
mentioned above, there is a lot of ambiguity that surrounds the cases of zina and how to 
deal with them. Hanafi jurists were reluctant in stipulating that certain cases would be 
deemed as zina. As such, they were of the opinion that at times illicit practices could bear 
a resemblance to licit practices, and on the occasion that the legality of a case of zina is 
questioned, then the fixed punishment could not be imposed.660  
Prostitution is a case in point. Seeing as that it involves some form of payment for 
sexual intercourse paid by a client, it bears resemblance to the payment of a dowry 
required by marriage or concubinage where a husband entertains his sexual rights.661 
Hence, there is shubha when it comes to outlining the legality of prostitution that would 
not necessarily incur the fixed penalty. The ambiguity is caused, as argued by the Hanafi 
jurists, when a man says the words “I give your this dowry in order to commit zina with 
you.”662 According to jurists, this would be an obvious crime transgressing hudud Allah 
and would require the hadd punishment.663 Hence, the shari’a provisions are not explicit 
in respect to whether prostitution is deemed as an illegal or legal act. According to a 17th 
Century Ottoman jurist, he argues that, “sex for hire did not warrant the hadd punishment 
required for zina;”664 thus, it was a more complicated crime to establish than zina. 
Furthermore, the Hanafi legal doctrine also dictates that, “if a man hires a woman to 
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fornicate with her and does so…is subject to ta’zir. 665  Hence, there were no 
comprehensible legal codes that substantiate how prostitution should be dealt with. 
However, prostitution also raised a number of questions other than committing illicit 
sexual intercourse, which are: procuring, soliciting, public indecency, human trafficking, 
and disrupting of neighborhood security, which might have made it all the more difficult 
to deal with.666   
 Under the Ottoman Criminal Code, prostitution was not only a matter of 
committing sexual transgressions, but it was also regarded as a social and moral issue. It 
is dealt with in Chapters II (On Mutual Beating and Abuse, Killing and the Fines for 
Them) and III (On Fines and [Capital or Severe Corporal] Punishment for the Drinking of 
Wine, Theft, and Robbery and [other] Transgressions, Etc) of Suleyman I’s 
kanunname.667 According to Article 57: 
“If a person practices procuring, the cadi shall chastise [him or her] and 
expose [him or her to public scorn; in addition] a fine of one akçe shall be 
collected for each stroke.”668   
However, there are no explicit provisions in the kanunname stipulating specific 
punishments to prostitutes or their clients. As mentioned in Article 57, procuring is the 
case often dealt with more clearly in the kanun. Other than being sentenced to a form of 
discretionary punishment and a payment for each stroke, the offender committing 
procurement is also punished by being subjected to branding of the forehead or public 
scorn.669 Another kanun provision dealt with the issue of disrupting of the neighborhood, 
which was considered to be within the scope of prostitution. Members of a neighborhood 																																																								
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could appeal to court that a given person, who was considered as either a criminal or 
indecent, be banished from the neighborhood.670  
James Baldwin states that, “banishment from a neighborhood, rather than corporal 
and pecuniary punishments mentioned elsewhere in the kanunname and in fatwas, was by 
far the most common response to prostitution.”671 When members of a neighborhood 
came forth in seeking the banishment of a certain individual or a group of individuals, 
former were not obliged to prove beyond doubt that a person has committed prostitution 
or procurement or that any sexual transgressions had occurred.672 The kanun granted the 
right to members of the neighborhood community to request the banishment of certain 
individuals whom believed disrupted the security of the neighborhood with their acts. 
However, the plaintiffs had to be careful with the language that they used in their appeal 
before the court so they would avoid being accused of slander (qahdf) and would not be 
sentenced to a punishment of eighty lashes. They rather chose to use certain ambiguous 
terms, such as “off the straight path,” to hint at the sexual misconduct or immorality of a 
person.673  
Prostitution was also reflected in the fatwas of Ebu’s-su’ud. In this fatwa, the 
seyhulislam deals with prostitution as a crime of zina:  
Q: If a group makes it a custom to go from village to village, causing their 
wives, daughters and female slaves to commit fornication, what is their 
sentence according to the shari’a? 
A: They should all, without exception, suffer an extremely severe 
chastisement and not be released from prison until their reform becomes 
evident. Those women whose fornication is proven should all be stoned.674 																																																								
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It is interesting to note here that according to the Bursa court records examined by 
Gerber, the bulk of the cases dealing with prostitution all asserted that the prostitutes 
were caught committing the act of zina. However, even though the obvious shari’a hadd 
penalty was either flogging or stoning to death, none of the cases demonstrate that such 
punishments were enforced. In most cases, the prostitute is either banished from the 
neighborhood or subjected to discretionary punishment.675   
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Conclusion 
 
As seen in the previous chapters, the doctrine of the shari’a to a large degree was 
broadened by the regulations set forth by the kanun. The way law was imposed from 
above by the state and dealt with on the grassroot level of society serves as a mixture of 
the two legal codes. However, the question that remains, to what extent did it matter 
which law was applied? Aside from the clear-cut innovations that the sharia introduced in 
the Ottoman legal process, people were presenting their cases before the court knowing 
full-handedly that they now had a place to bring their private matters into the public 
sphere. Even though the imposition of new Ottoman policies was at times met with 
opposition, the court became an integral element in people’s daily lives. It served as the 
nexus between state and society where it mediated almost all types of cases ranging from 
crimes, to family, to taxes, etc. According to Hanna, “Justice was quick and simple. 
There were no long delays and no complicated procedures.”676 To know the extent of the 
viability of this requires a more closer and comprehensive study of court records in the 
core areas of the empire as compared to the provincial areas to have a clearer 
understanding of the day-to-day interactions of the people. Unfortunately, though the 
court records provide for a rich historical authority, they are still lacking in some respects 
wherein the full dimensions of the cases were not explicated and only the basic 
summaries and highlights were records. Nevertheless, they have been the commanding 
form of evidence when it comes to the history of the Ottoman Empire. 
 The innovations in the Ottoman legal administration constituted a fundamental 
portion of Ottoman history. The loosening of laws to accommodate contemporary 																																																								
676 Hanna, “Marriage among Merchant Families,” p. 145. 
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practices and place them within the confines of the law through practicality, adaptability 
and flexibility reconfigured the entire structure of Ottoman legal thought. There have 
been many contributions and efforts by the state functionaries to reconcile the kanun with 
the shari’a. However, Ottoman legal provisions retained a more pragmatic character than 
that of the shari’a as certain cases under the latter’s doctrinal traditions were not 
expanded on or were not quite clear. Thus, the kanun could be regarded as having served 
as an extension of the shari’a in dealing with more contemporary issues under the 
justification of the maslaha of society. As such, Baldwin alleges that the way qadi courts 
came to deal with certain crimes in regulating society “cannot be characterized as the 
non-application of Islamic law.” 677  However, when examining the kanun-shari’a 
discourse, one has to consider that the shari’a has been interpreted in a number of ways 
and there have been a lot of efforts in circumventing certain legal Islamic regulations to 
make ends meet. This goes back to the idea that Islam is not the same everywhere.   
 The Empire was keep to bring in line all its provinces together and create a 
nucleus of centralized power through standardizing and unifying the law of procedure 
and the judicial system throughout the empire. The Ottoman authorities were keen to 
enjoin their subjects to adjust to the new innovations, and the kanun served as a tool in 
doing so. A way to impose the state’s hegemony was by making people accountable for 
their actions before the law and by integrating them into the judicial system. Nonetheless, 
people had little choice by to adapt and adopt the Ottoman modifications injected into 
their societies. The degree of power that the state exercised by the 16th Century over large 
territories with extended frontiers and a more diverse population was one way to enforce 
its hegemony. For the continuation of an empire over a number of centuries, despite 																																																								
677 Baldwin, Prostitution, p. 119. 
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elements of decline, it had to become a pervasive force of change. Even though there was 
a process of secularization taking place in adopting the newly codified Ottoman laws, 
there was always the dichotomy between law and application—theory and practice—that 
the state was faced with; hence the many efforts of reconciliation and attempts to create a 
symbiosis of legal codes. However, as Heyd clearly puts it, “the kanun is conceived as a 
supplement to the shari’a, theoretically inferior to it but prevailing over it in practice.”678 
Despite the attempts of the empire to retain its religiosity, there were constant ventures to 
make the law more adaptable and pragmatic.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																																
678 Heyd, Old Ottoman Criminal Law. 
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